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Roll on, thou deep and dark blue ocean — roll!
Ten thousand fleets sweep over thee in vain;
Man marks the earth with ruin — his control
Stops with the shore; — upon the watery plain
The wrecks are all thy deed, nor doth remain
A shadow of man's ravage, save his own . . . .
Childe Harold's Pilgrimage





UNCHARTED WATERS: NON-INNOCENT PASSAGE
OF WARSHIPS IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
On the night of 27 October 1981, a Soviet "whiskey" class
submarine carrying a crew of fifty-six ran aground inside a restricted
security zone nine miles southeast of the Karlskrona Naval Base, deep
2
within Swedish territorial waters. Following an eleven-day drama,
3
which included lodging two diplomatic protests, sighting another sub-
H
marine's periscope and turning back a Soviet salvage vessel both inside
Swedish territorial waters, and discovering uranium 238 emanating from
the submarine's hull, the Swedish government concluded "that the
submarine had intentionally violated Swedish territory to gather intelli-
gence." Having initially called it "the most grave intrusion into
o
Swedish territory since World War II," Prime Minister Thorbjorn Falldin
termed the violation "all the more remarkable since in all probability the
9
submarine has carried nuclear weapons into Swedish territory." Its
investigation closed, on 6 November the Swedish Navy escorted the
submarine to the twelve-mile limit, where it joined a flotilla of twenty
Soviet warships waiting just outside.
News reports of the incident, which brought to light the frequency
of unidentified submarine sightings in Swedish territorial waters,
included an account of a ten-day pursuit, with depth charges, of two
unidentified submarines in the Stockholm Archipellago just thirteen
12
months before. It came as no surprise, then, when the Swedish Navy
-1-

in early October of last year sighted a submarine deep inside its terri-
torial waters near the top-secret naval base on Musko Island, some
1
3
twenty miles south of Stockholm. After maneuvering for a week and-
a-half to contain the submarine and dropping over thirty depth charges
to force it to the surface for identification, Swedish naval authorities
14
acknowledged that it had apparently escaped.
Whatever their impact on Sweden's defense posture, its traditional
neutrality, or its relations with Warsaw Pact countries — whose sub-
marines many believe these to be — such obvious violations of terri-
torial waters point to a larger problem. They highlight the inadequacy
of the current state of international law effectively to prevent, control,
or remedy non-innocent passage of foreign warships within the territorial
sea during time of peace.
Innocent Passage: The Foundation of Modern Naval Mobility
The freedom of navies to transit the globe is of utmost strategic
importance to the major maritime powers. Whether the mission be
defense of merchant shipping, support of allies, projection of political or
military influence, or strategic nuclear deterrence, the maritime
nations — under the lingering sway of Mahan — view maximum naval
mobility as essential to their security and economic well being.
Threats to that mobility lie in creeping extensions of coastal state
sovereignty. Transit rights for modern warships through these
sovereign waters, particularly those comprising straits and international
sea routes, spring from the custom of innocent passage.
Within the last quarter century, this custom has twice appeared in
international treaties — most recently in an expanded and detailed form
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as part of the comprehensive new United Nations Convention on Law of
1 8
the Sea. Although maritime powers have readily embraced the
Convention's transit provisions as guaranteeing the desired freedom of
19passage while protecting coastal state interests, the treaty has yet to
become effective. Should the delicate balance of interests worked out in
the decade-long negotiations that produced the Convention fail to gain
full accpetance — a chance significantly increased by the United States'
20
refusal to sign — innocent passage, which plays a secondary role to
more expanded transit rights in the Convention, is likely again to
21
emerge as the primary guarantor of naval mobility. Owing to its
fundamental importance as the residual legal regime for securing transit
of all ships through sovereign seas, the convention of innocent passage
bears study from both historical and contemporary perspectives, for
understanding the scope and nature of the innocent passage right is an
essential prerequisite to confronting the problem of non-innocent
passage.
Non- Innocent Passage: The Uncharted Waters
This article debates neither the proper breadth of the territorial
sea, nor the merits of various transit regimes; these issues are taken to
have been settled by and among the signatories of the new Convention.
Nor does it attempt to replay or analyze the negotiations leading to that
agreement. Rather, this study focuses on an existing international
convention, innocent passage, and asks how it may be made workable in
a specific and recurring instance — its breach — in the face of strong
political and military overtones. The approach is exploratory, not
dogmatic; the goal, a practical solution acceptable to all. To accomplish
-3-

this task, the present study seeks to chart the legal waters of non-
innocent passage by probing the depths of the following questions with
the sounding lines of customary and treaty law, by taking bearings from
the competing interests involved, and by testing the open channels thus
marked against history and hypothesis: Who decides whether passage of
a foreign warship in the territorial sea is innocent? By what criteria?
What enforcement and appeal mechanisms, if any, exist? What political
factors shape such decisions? The answers to these questions are vitally
important to both coastal states, such as Sweden, whose territorial
waters are being flagrantly violated with increasing frequency, and major
naval powers, whose vessels, statistically, are most likely to intrude.
THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE FOR WARSHIPS
IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
We begin our charting with the concepts of territorial sea, innocent
passage, and warships as they have applied to peace-time relations
among nations. Three periods of development suggest themselves: 1)
The historic regime: customary and treaty law before 1958; 2) The
present regime: the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea; and 3) the
emerging regime: the 1982 Convention on Law of the Sea. The relation-
ship between innocent passage in the territorial sea and its analogue in
two closely related maritime regimes, international straits and




Division of the Seas
Although all ships enjoy unrestricted operations on the high seas,
as they approach land this freedom yields increasingly to coastal state
interests, giving rise to separate maritime regimes of increasing
stringency. For purposes of navigation, these regimes number five:
the high seas, international straits, territorial waters, and internal
waters are the traditional divisions; the new Convention on Law of the
22Sea adds to these the regime of archipelagic waters. Conceptually,
international straits and archipelagic waters are closely linked to, and
23
often considered merely special instances of, territorial waters.
We owe the freedom of the high seas to the influence of the writ-
ings of Hugo de Croot, better known as Crotius, who, in 1608, in the
face of a proliferation of sweeping claims of sovereignty over the sea,
24
wrote that the sea could not be made the property of any state. State
sovereignty over its internal waters — rivers, bays, ports and
25
estuaries — had long been recognized in international law. Crotius
sought to meet the contention that like sovereignty existed in the expan-
sive claims of waters external to the State. This argument led first to
freedom of navigation within the sovereign claims and gradually held
sway until, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, freedom of the
27high seas was firmly established. Simultaneously, there arose the
concept of a narrow maritime belt running the length of the coastline and
separating it from the high seas. Viewed primarily as a protective
buffer against naval incursion, this maritime belt was guarded by coastal
batteries. Whether its genesis lay in the "cannon shot rule" or in the
marine league, the three-mile territorial sea had, with few exceptions,
-5-

gained world-wide recognition by the beginning of the twentieth
28
century. Although the subsequent movement to extend the territorial
sea has prompted much debate and resulted in a variety of specialized
29
regimes, no law of the sea issue has raised as much excitement during




For international commerce to occur, merchant ships required access
to foreign ports. But to enter port, each ship had first to traverse the
sovereign zone of waters adjacent to the shore. Although a general
31
right of passage appeared in the public law of the Holy Roman Empire,
Bynkershoek pointed out the inconsistency of such a right with that
extension of coastal state sovereignty measured by cannon fire from the
32
shore. " Thus, until the mid-nineteenth century, innocent passage was
33
considered, where observed, purely a matter of European public law.
In 1844, Masse" argued that the nature of dominion over the territorial
34
sea was jurisdictional, not possessory. In this manner, he sought to
resolve the perceived inconsistency of innocent passage with coastal state
sovereignty. Such passage had to be in every way inoffensive and
35
without danger. This view gained following during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, culminating — through the filter of international
3fi
codification efforts — in our present law of innocent passage. It is
37




Warships differ from merchant ships in three particulars: They are
manned by a crew subject to regular naval discipline, commanded by a
duly commissioned naval officer, and identifiable as belonging to the
38
naval forces of a state. Initially thought of as floating extensions of
the sovereign territory of their flag states, warships remained immune
from the jurisdiction of other states as long as they were acting in the
39
service of the state. They were expected voluntarily to comply with
the laws of coastal states concerning anchorage, sanitation, quarantine,
40
customs, and order in port; non-compliance was ground for expulsion.
If a warship committed violent acts against other vessels or against
officials of a coastal state, only such measures could be taken as were
41
necessary to prevent further acts of violence. Although over time the
concept of floating sovereignty waned, the immunity it gained for
42
warships remains a principle of customary law. Only during the last
century has distinction between warships and merchant vessels become of
significance with respect to passage in the territorial sea. Prior to the
mid-1 800's, warships and merchant ships stood on equal footing, because
the right to exclude all foreign ships was generally conceded to the
43
coastal states. Since the turn of the century, however, the right of
passage of warships has come under increasing scrutiny; indeed, it has
become "[o]ne of the most controversial auestions concerning the terri-
44
torial sea." The controversy has centered around whether such
passage is a right or a mere comity: if a right, the coastal state cannot
45
act arbitrarily; it comity, it may be withdrawn at will. This debate




By 1948, the state of the law of transit in the territorial sea
included: 1) a customary right of innocent passage for all merchant
vessels, 2) a usage of innocent passage for foreign warships and public
vessels in time of peace, and 3) a customary right of innocent passage
for warships in "highways for international traffic" which pass through
47
the territorial sea. If we take this latter right to apply to inter-
national straits located wholly within the territorial sea, the reasoning of
the International Court of Justice in the most significant case dealing
with innocent passage of warships becomes clear.
The Corfu Channel Case
Although the British intention in sending warships through the
Corfu channel in October of 1946 — and the theory it put forth in
argument before the International Court — was to assert the general
right of innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea, of which it
48
viewed this as but a particular instance, the Court limited its holding
to the exercise of passage "through straits used for international naviga-
tion between two parts of the high seas," which it said could take place
"without the previous authorization of the coastal State, provided that
the passage is innocent ," and which could not be prohibited in time of
49
peace. The Court, in effect, discovered in the customary law a
50
special rule for transit of straits, even though the straits may lie, as
those at Corfu, wholly within the territorial sea of one nation. Sub-
sequent writers have confused this rule with the general principle
regarding transit of warships in the territorial sea, concerning which the
52Court was conspicuously silent. This confusion resulted in a codified
53
confounding of the two rules less than a decade later.
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The Present Regime: The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
By 1958, the movement toward a twelve-mile territorial sea had
gained sufficient support to cast doubt upon the continued viability of
the old three-mile rule. Absent general agreement among the delegates
on either standard, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Con-
54
tiguous Zone remained silent concerning the former's breadth. It did
establish, however, through legislation and codification of custom, both
detailed procedures for determining baselines from which to measure the
55
territorial sea and a series of rules governing innocent passage within
56
it. Article 1 affirms coastal state sovereignty over the territorial sea
but subjects its exercise to the provisions of the Convention and to
57
"other rules of international law." Article 2 extends sovereignty to
include the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil beneath the
territorial sea.
The lively debate concerning innocent passage of warships drew
CO
heavily on practical consequences and sparsely on legal precedent.
Reflecting the ancient tensions between non-maritime coastal states on
the one hand and seafaring nations on the other, the Convention's
ultimate pronouncement regarding passage of warships left something to
59be desired by nearly everyone. Among the commentators, the debate
over the Convention's innocent passage provisions continues: some
argue that the provisions are inconsistent with the intent of the
drafters; others, that their meaning is ambiguous and resort must still
be had to customary law to determine the appropriate transit rules for
fii
warships. Although a controversial rule concerning prior notification
or authorization of warship passage failed to win sufficient support for
inclusion in the treaty, despite confusing the separate straits transit
-9-

issue, the remaining articles provide a strong contextual argument for
having legislatively established a full right of innocent passage for
warships in the territorial sea.
The regime of the territorial sea appears in part I of the Conven-
tion, section III of which, entitled "Right of Innocent Passage," contains
ten articles arranged in four subsections: "A. Rules Applicable to All
Ships," "B. Rules Applicable to Merchant Ships," "C. Rules Appli-
cable to Government Ships Other Than Warships," and "D. Rule
Applicable to Warships." The four articles of subsection A establish
the general rules of innocent passage. Article 14 begins, "Subject to
the provision of these articles, ships of all states, whether coastal or
not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea." The article continues, defining and describing passage, explain-
ing innocence as "not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
(TO CO
the coastal state," placing restrictions on foreign fishing vessels,
and requiring submarines "to navigate on the surface and to show their
flag." Other pertinent articles restrain the coastal state from hamper-
ing innocent passage but allow it to take "necessary steps in its
72
territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent." For
"protection of . . . security," article 16 permits temporary suspension of
innocent passage in specified areas of the territorial sea on a non-
73
discriminatory basis after publication, but it prohibits such suspension
"through straits . . . used for international navigation between one part
of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea
74
of a foreign state." The final article of this section requires ships in
innocent passage to comply with coastal state laws and regulations,
particularly those relating to transport and navigation.
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Rules regarding permissible fees and criminal and civil juris-
78
diction over merchant ships appear in subsection B. Subsection C
distinguishes between government ships operated for commercial
79 80
purposes and those operated for non-commercial purposes and
explains, in light of existing concepts of immunity for public vessels,
which portions of subsection B, in addition to the rules applicable to all
ships, apply to each.
The warship rule, article 23, permits the coastal state to require a
warship to leave its territorial sea if, first, the warship does not comply
with the coastal state's regulations "concerning passage through the
82
territorial sea," and further, it "disregards any request for compliance
83
which is made to it." Despite the elimination from the final draft of
the proposed rule requiring prior notice or authorization for the transit
of warships, some scholars, nevertheless, read license for such exten-
84
sive coast state control in this language. This ignores that the right
85
of innocent passage is accorded to a]| ships. Others suggest that
since subsection C incorporates the rules of subsection A by " specific
reference ," whereas subsection D does not, the Convention grants no
general right of transit for warships. This argument collapses of its
own weight under scrutiny: applied to subsection B, which, like sub-
section D, also omits reference to subsection A, merchant vessels would
likewise be excluded, leaving only government ships to enjoy a general
right of innocent passage. The fallacy of the specific reference argu-
ment springs from a misunderstanding of the necessary function specific
reference performs in subsection C; it distinguishes the different
regulatory regimes for commercial and non-commercial government
-11-

vessels — a procedure wholly unnecessary in the explanations of rules
governing merchant vessels and warships.
One final provision, article 5, places the Convention's innocent
passage articles in perspective and underlines "the extent to which the
right of innocent passage has become a fundamental principle of the law
87
of the sea and ought not to be interfered with." Where the drawing
of straight baselines, as permitted by article 4, encloses as internal
waters areas previously considered part of the territorial sea or of the
high seas, "a right of innocent passage, as provided in articles 14 to
88
23 , shall exist in those waters." This provision not only refers to the
innocent passage articles — including the one for warships — as a
whole, partaking of a singular "right"; it also limits coastal states from
denying this right in their newly-acquired internal waters by treating
the areas of expansion, in effect, as territorial, rather than internal,
89
waters.
Although the Convention admits to a consistent interpretation on its
face, its effect is not without question. The interpretation advanced
here yields a right of innocent passage for warships that cannot be
burdened by requirements of prior notice or authorization. If, nonethe-
less, article 23 may somehow be independent of the other innocent
passage provisions, then prior permission for warships could conceivably
be required. The late Professor O'Connell expressed reservations
toward both these views. He believed the Convention effectively
"shelved" the question of the degree to which warship transit could be
90
regulated; consequently, in his view custom still prevails. On this
point he found "no evidence of state practice before very recent times
91
other than free and uncontested passage of warships."
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On a much broader scale than ever before, the world community
sought again in the 1970's to face this issue within the context of a
periodic, continuing negotiation to produce a comprehensive and detailed
multinational treaty which would govern all aspects of international sea
law. We turn now to examine the emerging consensus which resulted
from those efforts.
The Emerging Regime: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea
Signed in Jamaica on 10 December 1982, the United Nations Conven-
92
tion on the Law of the Sea " attempts to codify and legislate the entire
body of law which exists, or should exist, to regulate rights in, transit
through, use of and conflicts concerning the marine environment. The
93Convention begins with the territorial sea * and answers, at the outset,
a question that has eluded consensus for over fifty years: its breadth
91
may now extend to twelve miles. The remaining provisions dealing
with the limits of the territorial sea are, with minor additions,
95incorporated almost verbatim from the 1958 Convention.
Innocent Passage
The innocent passage provisions preserve the 1958 subsection
97
format of setting out separately the rules for all ships first, followed
98 99by additional rules for merchant ships and warships. While
incorporating the remaining 1958 articles virtually intact, the drafters
added eight new ones and established separate regimes for international
straits and archipelagic waters.
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All of the new articles apply to warships. Most significant among
them is article 19, which sets forth specific objective criteria by which
to measure the innocence of passage. Article 21 enumerates the areas
of permissible coastal state regulation with which [f]oreign ships
exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall
1 02
comply." ~ But article 24 explains that such regulations "shall not
hamper the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial
„ 103
sea":
In particular, in the application of this Convention, or of any
laws on regulations adopted in conformity with this Conven-
tion, the coastal state shall not:
(a) impose requirements on foreign ships which have the
practical effect of denying or impairing the right of
innocent passage; or
(b) discriminate in form or in fact against ships of any state
or against ships carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of
any state.
The other general articles include optional rules for establishing sea lane
and traffic separation schemes and requirements relating to
"nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying other inherently dangerous or
noxious substances." Three of the new provisions appear in the
section dealing with warships. One incorporates an updated definition of
"warship"; another establishes liability for loss or damage resulting
from non-compliance with coastal state regulations; the third identifies
certain exceptions to the immunity of warships and government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes.
Hence, the right of innocent passage for warships in the territorial
sea has been made more definite. Although it cannot be denied or
impaired by the coastal state, the manner of its exercise — the only
109
remaining issue of contention — is subject to certain coastal state
-14-

rights and regulations. Where necessary for safety of navigation, the
coastal state may designate sea lanes for nuclear powered ships, but it
may not otherwise prevent their innocent passage. Submarines must
still navigate on the surface and show their flag. The coastal state,
of course, retains its right to take "necessary steps in its territorial sea
112
to prevent passage which is not innocent" " and to "suspend tempo-
rarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of
foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its
1 1
3
security." Finally, the coastal state may expel from its territorial
waters any warship which fails to comply with its laws and regulations
and disregards any request for compliance.
Article 8 reaffirms the continued right of innocent passage through
newly-enclosed internal waters formed by the drawing of straight base-
lines from "areas which had not previously been considered as such."
Its provisions appear to apply equally to innocent passage through the
territorial sea and through two closely related new regimes: inter-
national straits and archipelagic waters.
International Straits
Although the regime of transit passage embodied in the Convention's
straits provisions grew out of compromise, its roots lay in custom. By
the beginning of World War I, warships had gained customary recognition
of their right to transit international straits. Although frequently
described by commentators as "innocent passage," in practice, the
118
straits transit right involved something more. The International
Court of Justice, in the Corfu Channel Case , identified the additional
element: "Unless otherwise prescribed in an international convention,
-15-

there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage through
119
straits in time of peace." The Court found the decisive characteristic
warranting free transit through an international strait to be its
1 20geographic connection of two parts of the high seas. A discrepancy
121between the authoritative French text, which subordinates use of the
strait for international navigation to its geographic situation, and the
122
English translation, ~ which treats the two as co-equal requirements,
undoubtedly contributed to the confusion concerning straits passage
123
apparent in the 1958 Convention. Treating straits transit as merely
an application of innocent passage through the territorial sea, the
drafters adopted the rationale of the English translation, requiring of
"international straits" both geographic connection and use for inter-
124
national navigation. Although properly recognizing a separate regime
of transit for straits, the 1982 Convention tipped the balance even
further away from geographic considerations. Part III, the Convention's
straits section, was entitled, "Straits Used for International Navigation."
Clearly, use has become the new critere d^cisif of international
•* 125
straits.
Within the usage qualification, the geographic criterion does,
however, distinguish three separate levels of strait regulation under the
Convention. Straits which contain a "route through the high seas or
1 7 fi
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience" fall out-
127
side the straits provisions. Through straits connecting "one part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the
1 28
high seas or an exclusive economic zone," all ships and aircraft enjoy
129
the right of transit passage , which shall not be impeded." Those
straits which are excluded from transit passage by virtue of the
-16-

existence of a seaward route of similar convenience or which connect "a
part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and the territorial
sea of a foreign state," retain the regime of territorial seas innocent
passage, with its qualification that there shall be no suspension of
130innocent passage through such straits. Regardless of their geo-
graphic situation, all other straits within the territorial sea not used for
international navigation fall under the suspendable innocent passage
provisions of part II.
132
Transit passage conducted in the "normal modes" must be
133
"continuous and expeditious"; ships and aircraft exercising this right
1 34
must "proceed without delay through or over the strait." Many of
the transit passage articles have analogues among those governing
135innocent passage: a list of duties of ships and aircraft in transit, a
1 ^fi
prohibition of marine research or survey, a sea lanes and traffic
1 37
separation scheme, a list of permissible topics of strait state regu-
138
lation and restrictions concerning their application, a liability
139
provision for vessels and aircraft with sovereign immunity, and a
140duty not to hamper or suspend transit passage. The parallelism of
these rules with those governing innocent passage reinforces the view
that both rights are intended to operate broadly. Concomitantly, the
duties of the transiting vessels are clear; they must avoid the
enumerated prohibited activities, comply with lawful coastal state regu-
lations and applicable international regulations, and refrain from other




A growing concept in recent years, archipelagic status is officially
1 42
recognized in the Convention. Archipelagic states are permitted to
draw straight baselines to enclose within their perimeters vast expanses
1 43
of "archipelagic waters," up to a ratio of nine parts water to one part
144
land. Archipelagic state sovereignty extends to the waters and their
1 45
vertically adjacent airspace, land, subsoil, and resources. Within the
archipelagic waters, each state may delimit its own internal waters for
146
river mouths, bays, and ports. Encircling the archipelagic waters,
147
measured from their outermost edge, lies the territorial sea. As with
straits, two levels of transit rights exist: innocent passage, of the
territorial sea-type, for ships through any part of archipelagic
148
waters, and "archipelagic sea lanes passage" for ships and aircraft in
designated sea lanes or on designated air routes through or over
1 49
archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea. The same transit
duties, scientific research restrictions, state regulatory authority, and
prohibitions concerning hampering or suspending transit passage through
international straits apply mutatis mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes
passage. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage may deviate up to
twenty-five miles to either side of the designated sea lane's axis, but
they shall respect established and applicable sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes.
Summary of Warship Passage
The foregoing provisions support the following generalizations
concerning the Convention's treatment of the passage of warships:
-18-

1. Warships enjoy the same rights of transit as do merchant ships in
all three regimes, the territorial sea, international straits, and
archipelagic waters.
2. A right of innocent passage, subject to temporary suspension,
152
exists through the territorial sea, newly enclosed internal waters,
archipelagic waters, and straits within the territorial sea not used for
international navigation. Warships exercising this right are subject to
the coastal state's dual rights of protection against passage which is not
innocent and of expulsion for non-compliance with its laws and
regulations.
3. A non-suspendable right of innocent passage exists within the
territorial sea and newly-enclosed internal waters through straits used
for international navigation between a part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign state. This
right is also exercised subject to the coastal state's rights of protection
and expulsion.
4. A non-suspendable right of transit passage applies within the
territorial sea and newly-enclosed internal waters to straits that are used
for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and another such part.
5. An equivalent right of archipelagic sea lanes passage applies
through archipelagic waters and their adjacent territorial seas within
-19-

designated archipelagic sea lanes or, if none are designated, through
routes normally used for international navigation.
6. Flag states of warships exercising any of the foregoing rights are
liable for loss or damage resulting from breaches of coastal state laws
and regulations.
7. Submarines must surface and show their flag while exercising the
right of innocent passage. During transit and archipelagic sea lanes
passage, they may navigate in the "normal mode," that is, submerged.
Application of the Convention
Will the Convention ever come into force? If it does, what will be
the respective rights of signatories and non-signatories? Who will be
bound, and who not bound, by it? Commentators speculate that since it
took four years for the 1958 Convention to garner sufficient acceptance
to become operable, and since the new Convention requires substantially
more ratifications to activate it than the total number of parties to the
1958 agreement, we may expect a considerable period to elapse prior to
154
its entry into force.
In the interim, to the extent that it declares custom, and it has
been forcefully argued that its navigational articles do so, the law it
embodies is already evident in, and binding upon, state practice. The
territorial sea innocent passage provisions ground themselves in both
custom and the 1958 Convention; the regime of transit passage through
straits "approximates to the situation stabilized in the customary law by
1 *ifi
the practice of States." Archipelagic sea lanes passage through
-20-

newly-legislated archipelagic waters, likewise, recognizes an existing
right of passage, conceptually linked to straits transit passage and even
more closely akin to high seas "freedom of navigation" due to the vast
1 57
expanses of these potential archipelagic waters.
The Convention's application will be clear among its parties. Less
clear will be its force to bind third parties — most likely under a
universal application theory, if it is considered to have legislated, or as
158
a declaration of currently binding customary law. Also unclear is the
extent to which a non-party may invoke the benefits of the Convention
or suffer the reduction or loss of any rights or benefits it now asserts
159
or exercises contrary to the Convention's terms. These questions are
of considerable concern not only to the United States, which, at the
eleventh hour, withdrew its support for the Convention, but also to the
world community. For without global support, including that of all major
riparians and users of the seas, the Convention's purpose of introducing
certainty into the affairs of nations and promoting international respect
for the rule of law will falter and ultimately fail. A decade's work of
delicately balancing widely divergent interests will have left but a hollow
shell as its memorial.
NON-INNOCENT PASSAGE
However one may view the varying interpretations of customary and
treaty law as either retaining, expanding, or limiting transit rights of
warships, there always remains a territorial sea or analogous regime
wherein the fundamental convention of innocent passage applies. And
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wherever this right extends, there also lies the danger of non-innocent
passage. For the coastal state, non-innocent passage poses problems of
two orders: recognition and response.
Recognizing Non- Innocent Passage
Recognition of non-innocent passage involves physical perception of
the observable facts of warship transit against the backdrop of
principles or rules that govern such transit. Because the factual
question depends heavily on the context of each transit, this section
focuses primarily upon the legal standard by which to measure warship
actions in the territoral sea and, thereby, to determine the innocence or
non-innocence of passage.
The Factual Element
Recognition requires interpreting behavior, the motivation of which
may be unclear, first against the objective criteria of innocent passage,
then against domestic legislation and regulations related to innocent
passage. Interpreting behavior injects a subjective element into the
i fi?
application of objective standards. Unless an express hostile intent
has been communicated, it appears more fruitful to focus on the manner
in which passage is conducted rather than the often speculative intent
motivating the passage. Judging innocence or non-innocence of
passage bears a close resemblance to judging the criminality of individual
behavior. Just as there is no crime without law, there is also no crime
164
without a criminal act. The "law" in this case is the list of objective
criteria. As with general criminal intent, non-innocent intent may be




otherwise. Thus, a presumption of innocence must exist for each
passage undertaken through the territorial sea until, by virtue of some
prohibited act, the warship shows its passage to be non-innocent. The
burden of proving non-innocence, then, lies with the coastal state.
The Legal Criteria
Passage prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the
coastal state would be non-innocent under both Conventions.
Inasmuch as the 1958 Convention failed to further elaborate this
subjective standard, it left broad latitude for interpretation. Thus,
some commentators argued that warships should automatically be
1 CO
excluded, because they always threaten, or that nuclear-powered
vessels, or those carrying nuclear substances or weapons were
inherently dangerous and could, likewise, never pass innocently. In
this regard, the 1982 Convention represents a major step forward, for it
spells out in a list of objective criteria what the old subjective standard
means. Even if the new Convention were never to enter into force, the
list would still be important, because it represents an expression of
consensus of the community of nations regarding the nature of innocent
passage and the specific acts which render passage non-innocent:
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following
activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any
other manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations;




(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defence or security of the
coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity,
currency or person contrary to the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regula-
tions of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary
to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey
activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems
of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State;
(I) any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage.
The addition of a broad catch-all provision at the end suggests that the
list was meant to be exhaustive, not merely exemplary.
Within certain bounds, the coastal state may also impose other
restrictions not directly affecting the innocence of passage. Again, the
new Convention enlarges upon the general language of the 1958 pro-
172
vision " by specifying, in article 21, the permissible areas of
regulation, and again, the list is important as an expression of inter-
national consensus:
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in
conformity with the provisions of this Convention and other
rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through
the territorial sea, in respect of all or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of mari-
time traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and
other facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws
and regulations of the coastal State;
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(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal
State and the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs,
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations
of the coastal State.
A. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such
laws and regulations and all generally accepted international
regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.
1 74Such regulations must not hamper, deny or impair innocent passage.
Moreover, violation of these laws or regulations will not necessarily
render passage non-innocent. Paragraph four has a cognate among
the transit passage articles; taken together with the 1958 provision,
the parallel wording of the three articles implies separation of the quality
of passage issue from that of compliance with coastal state laws and
regulations. Thus, four situations may result:
1) innocent passage in compliance with coastal state regulations,
2) innocent passage not in compliance with coastal state
regulations,
3) non-innocent passage in compliance with coastal state
regulations, and
4) non-innocent passage not in compliance with coastal state
regulations.
This is not to say that innocence of passage and compliance with
coastal state regulations are mutually exclusive events. Analysis readily
shows overlapping subject matter in the areas of customs, fiscal, immi-
i *•
177 „ 178 -. .. 179 .
gration or sanitation regulations; pollution; fishing; research
180
and survey activities; and systems of communication or "other
181
facilities or installations" of the coastal state. These subjects of
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prejudicial conduct and coastal state regulation pertain primarily to
merchant and fishing vessels. By contrast, the remaining prejudicial
acts, those most applicable to warships, have only one possible cognate
left among the coastal state's repertoire against which to measure: "the
182
safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic." This
provision clearly contemplates not coastal state security, but the "safety"
and "regulation" of other vessels passing through the territorial sea.
Typical of such regulation might be the adoption of a sea lane or traffic
1 83
separation scheme. The warship innocent passage indicia are
concerns of a different order. They involve security, not safety, and
they clearly prohibit conduct which might jeopardize, in real or imagined
terms, the security of the coastal state. Accordingly, they stand
independent of further coastal state regulation. Thus, for activities
uniquely within the domain of warships, innocence and compliance with
coastal state regulations do appear largely mutually exclusive matters.
The effectiveness of coastal state legislative and regulatory
standards depend in large part upon the precision with which they are
drafted and upon their adherence to the generally accepted scope of
regulation. Legislative discretion in determining how broad or narrow
these regulations become remains a function of domestic politics.
Regulations formulated by those nations having little use for the sea are
likely to appear more stringent than those of nations maintaining a
significant level of seagoing activities. Whatever it scope, no such rule
has force against foreign vessels until the coastal state gives it "due
1 84
publicity." The analysis regarding whether or not such local laws or
regulations have been violated differs somewhat from that of non-




criteria — primarily of concern to merchant and fishing vessels —
there exists room for legislative fashioning of subjective standards which
may have the effect of reversing the presumption of innocence. For
warships, this coastal state competence appears primarily limited to
safety of navigation and traffic regulation schemes. These would seem
to require specific, detailed rules, thus preserving the necessity of an
1 Rfi
identifiable act by which the warship would violate the regulations.
The 1982 Convention also indicates one instance in which vessels
exercising the right of transit passage may fall under the rules of
innocent passage. Ships and aircraft in transit passage are admonished
to "refrain from any activities other than those incident to their normal
modes of continuous and expeditious transit," for any such activity
"remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this
1 87
Convention." The two logical points of this reference appear to be
the innocent passage and the dispute settlement provisions. This
qualification of the transit passage right could be argued to incorporate
by indefinite reference the full range of innocent passage prohibitions;
indeed, it may even be read more restrictively. Whereas the innocent
1 88
passage article contains a finite list of prohibitions, the transit
1 89
passage right has one specific prohibition and one general prohibition
which could manifest itself in variety of specific applications. The
saving distinction for transit passage is that it shall not be suspended.
The question becomes, then, if a transiting vessel is engaged in some
other activity, does it cease to be in "transit passage" for the purposes
of protection from non-suspension? An affirmative answer hardly seems
what the major maritime powers would have envisioned or consented to,
not because they were desirous of conducting other activities during
-27-
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transit passage, but because they wanted to insure against arbitrary or
unreasonable application of the Convention's rules to prevent transit
190
altogether. Owing to the fact that innocent passage through
international straits is not suspendable, the strait state seeking somehow
to apply innocent passage rules to warships it considers in violation of
transit passage is left with the futile prospect of requesting a vessel




Is Submerged Passage Non-Innocent?
In the context of this study, whether submerged passage is per se
1 92
non-innocent is of some moment. The 1958 Convention places its
provision requiring submarines to navigate on the surface at the end of
its article that grants the right of innocent passage and defines
1 93
"passage" and "innocent." Were it not for the immediately
superadjacent provision specifying the conditions under which foreign
194
fishing vessels "shall not be considered innocent," a contextual
argument could be made that failure to surface in the territorial sea
renders the submarine's passage non-innocent. Parallel language,
however, is missing from the submarine provision, "submarines are
195
required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag." Absence
of language saying that a failure to surface "shall not be considered
innocent," undercuts any assumption that such behavior is clearly
non-innocent and leaves in its wake uncertainty of application.
The uncertainty abates under the 1982 text, but not without close
scrutiny. Couched in a separate article, sandwiched between the indicia
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of non-innocent passage and the scope of permissible coastal state regu-
lation, lies the submarine provision, largely unchanged: "In the terri-
torial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to
navigate on the surface and to show their flag." Since the drafters
could easily have included this provision in the previous list of
non-innocent activities, but did not, it appears that they intended
operating on the surface not to be a requirement of innocence for
submarines. Rather, it is more logically consistent with other terms of
the Convention as an independent provision, in pursuance of which the
coastal state may adopt laws and regulations concerning "the safety of
1 97
navigation and the regulation of the marine environment." Sub-
marines, of course, with the sanction of both custom and treaty, do
navigate submerged in those portions of the territorial sea that comprise
international navigation routes through certain straits and archipelagic
198
waters.
The importance of distinguishing the determination of non-innocence
from that of violation of coastal state laws and regulations lies in the
differing levels of sanction available to meet each breach. Under both
Conventions ships in non-innocent passage are treated legally as though
they were passing through the coastal state's internal waters. Against
199
such passage, the littoral has a right of protection. The more limited
sanction of warning and expulsion applies to warship breaches of coastal
state laws and regulations. Thus, the characterization of a breach as
one rendering passage non-innocent or merely violative of some
regulation has important consequences in limiting the coast state's
available sanctions. Recognition of a violative act prompts consideration
of an appropriate response. Before exploring the decisionmaking process
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involved in determining whether a given warship's passage is innocent or
not, we turn first to consider what sanctions exist and how they may be
applied.
Responding to Non-Innocent Passage
What Measures May Be Taken?
Various immediate and long-range options exist for the coastal state
confronted with an apparent breach of innocent passage or its local
regulations. Because non-innocent passage is potentially more serious,
the scope of the immediate sanction is broader: "The coastal state may
take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
201
is not innocent." More limited is the two-tiered sanction immediately
available to meet warship violations of coastal state regulations: a
request for compliance, which, if disregarded, permits the coastal state
to require the warship immediately to leave the territorial sea. To
resolve any underlying problem of which the violative passage may be a
symptom, the coastal state may consider the political options of no action
202 203 204
at all, diplomatic protest, " negotiation, mediation, inquiry,
205
concilliation , regional agency settlement, the United Nations Security
Council, or other peaceful means; the legal options of arbitration or
207judicial settlement; and, in the most serious cases, the military option
208
of force. Although instances of non-innocent passage may evoke the
full range of these dispute settlement options, breach of coastal state
regulations alone does not warrant and cannot justify forceful response,
for the coastal state remains under a duty not to hamper, deny, or
209impair innocent (though non-compliant) passage. If the warship in
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violation of coastal state regulations fails to heed an initial warning and
refuses to leave when requested to do so, its passage at that point may,
but does not necessarily, become non-innocent. Provided the relevant
coastal state rule falls within the scope of permissible regulation — a
question not without foreseeable controversy — the warship's failure to
leave the territorial sea upon request for an actual, as opposed to a
merely technical, violation of coastal state rules will render that passage
non-innocent and, hence, subject to the broader sanction. The passage
becomes non-innocent not due to the warship's violation of the coastal
state's properly drawn rule, but due to its non-compliance with the
210
Convention or other rules of international law, which, inter alia,
require continuous and expeditious passage and prohibit activities not
21
1
having a direct bearing on that passage. By definition, a vessel
exercising the right of innocent passage, except when proceeding to
internal waters, is in the continuous and expeditious process of leaving
212
the territorial sea. A warship is unlikely to refuse to continue its
departure when specifically requested to do so; if it does, it removes
itself from innocent passage and invites stronger sanction.
The foregoing measures remain subject to the United Nations
Charter provisions which require all members to "settle their inter-
national disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
213
peace and security, and justice, are not endangered," and prohibit
them "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
214
with the Purposes of the United Nations." Furthermore, the 1982
Convention requires settlement "by peaceful means" of any dispute
215
concerning its "interpretation or application." Because they are well
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known, the traditional methods of dispute settlement require little
additional comment outside the context of the Convention's dispute
settlement provisions. After first reviewing the option of no action and
before taking up the use of force, we shall consider these settlement
provisions and their efficacy in resolving violations of territorial waters.
No Action
Based upon the principle that the passage of every ship through
the territorial sea is presumed to be innocent and in compliance with
2 1 fi
applicable regulations until demonstrated otherwise, "no action" should
be the coastal state's normally expected response to any given transit.
The choice of no action may also follow minor breaches or technical
infractions which have no direct bearing on the domestic or international
affairs of the coastal state. Under other circumstances involving more
serious breaches, the coastal state may decide, for political reasons, to
take no action. Resort to this alternative may also result from a dearth
217
of navy and air force assets; many coastal states simply lack the
operative capability to recognize and respond to every — or some, to
any — violation of their territorial waters.
Settlement of Non-Innocent Passage Disputes Under the
1982 Convention"
The 1982 Convention requires parties to a dispute to "proceed
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding its settlement by negoti-
218
ation or other peaceful means." Although it encourages the use of
219
those means specified in the United Nations Charter, it allows the




of their own choice." " The Convention also provides a voluntary
221
conciliation procedure for those parties desiring to utilize this means.
If the parties fail to resolve their dispute voluntarily through peaceful
222
means, they shall "proceed expeditiously to an exchange of views."
Thereafter, subject to certain exceptions, any party to the dispute may
223
initiate a compulsory and binding dispute resolution procedure.
Embodied in a comprehensive agreement designed to regulate human
conduct over three-quarters of the earth's surface, this compulsory
jurisdiction feature distinguishes the Convention's arbitration and judicial
settlement procedures from the ineffectual optional protocol of the 1958
224
agreements and the largely consensual jurisdiction of existing
225
institutions.
Four guiding aspirations shaped the Convention's compulsory
dispute settlement provisions: grounding them in law to preserve
equality of states and to prevent political and economic pressures,
achieving uniformity in the Convention's interpretation, maximizing
obligatory settlement by narrowly drafting any exceptions, and integrat-
ing the dispute resolution provisions into the body of the Convention.
At the core of the compulsory provisions are a newly-created Inter-
national Tribunal for Law of the Sea and a procedure for constituting
227
arbitration panels to decide disputes arising under the Convention.
Parties to the Convention may, within limits, select in advance to submit
disputes to the International Tribunal, the International Court of
Justice, a general arbitral tribunal or a special, technical arbitral
228
tribunal. Each party may select one or more of the four options; if
it selects none, it will be deemed to have accepted general arbitra-
229
tion. Unless the parties agree differently, if they have accepted
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the same procedure, it will apply; otherwise general arbitration will
230
apply. The strength of the Convention's compulsory but flexible
dispute settlement procedures is substantially eroded, however, by
231
certain limitations and exceptions to compulsory jurisdiction, two of
which merit comment.
Special limiting provisions make disputes between coastal states and
flag states regarding exercise of the coastal state's "sovereign rights or
jurisdiction" or infringement or abuses of "the freedoms and rights of
232
navigation" subject to arbitral or judicial settlement. In the nature of
233
a guarantee rather than a limitation of jurisdiction, these provisions
underline the concern with which the maritime powers view the
Convention's extensions of coastal state jurisdiction as impinging upon
234
traditional high seas freedoms. They reflect also the coastal state's
concern to be free from undesired intrusion by ships of the maritime
235
powers. The compromise, to permit binding resolution of both
questions, provides "another example of the dynamics of the dialectics
between nationalism and internationalism in making ocean law and
mechanisms." While these specific "limitations" apply to activities in
the exclusive economic zone, they carry implications for warship transit
in the territorial sea. Viewed as a guarantee of jurisdiction for binding
dispute resolution amid limitations of that same jurisdiction regarding
other subject matters, these provisions imply, both by emphasizing the
need for some form of obligatory procedure to resolve disputes in this
touchy area and by the absence of any additional limiting language
regarding the territorial sea, that the full range of binding and non-
binding settlement options applies to disputes arising within the terri-
237
torial sea. In view of the greater quantum of coastal state dominion
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and control over the territorial seas, can this conclusion be correct?
With a surface area over fifteen and-a-half times that of the territorial
238
sea * in addition to its liberal navigational regime, the economic zone
holds high potential for conflict among its users. Not so in the terri-
torial sea, where the coastal state's full sovereignty encounters only the
239
limited and narrowly defined right of innocent passage. Thus,
although the coastal state's possessory and regulatory rights are greater
in the territorial sea, many developing coastal states have tended to
focus instead upon protection of their discretionary rights in the
240
economic zone. The result is that the Convention's dispute settlement
"limitations" do not apply to warship passage in the territorial sea.
241Among the Convention's "optional exceptions," however, one —
that for military operations — raises potentially serious questions
concerning the treatment of non-innocent passage disputes. From one or
more of the compulsory, binding means of dispute settlement, States
242
Parties may except:
(b) disputes concerning military activities, including military
activities by government vessels and aircraft engaged in
non-commercial service, and disputes concerning law
enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of
sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the
jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under article 297,
paragraph 2 or 3.
Does this exclusion apply to warships in the territorial sea? Among the
dispute settlement literature, two views emerge by implication: that the
military exception applies only to "military activities and certain law
enforcement measures connected with the exercise of sovereignty within
243
the coastal States' EEZ" and that coastal states could apply it "to
naval passage through straits or through territorial seas and economic
244
zones." While historical comparison of earlier drafts and grammatical
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analysis (which may only reflect the historical grafting process) lend
credence to the view that the military exclusion was intended to operate
245
broadly, other evidence points convincingly to its application only
within the exclusive economic zone. Unquestionably, the second half of
the provision deals solely with enforcement activities in the exclusive
246
economic zone. The first half specifies military activities , not just
military vessels. This implies military maneuvers, exercises, weapons
practice and the like. Military activities can be conducted freely on the
high seas. High seas freedom of navigation applies in the exclusive
economic zone. Innocent passage, by definition, excludes military
activities though not military vessels from the territorial sea, and hence
from archipelagic waters. Transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes
passage allow only those military activities incident to normal
247
navigation through portions of the territorial sea and archipelagic
waters comprising international straits and archipelagic sea lanes.
"Aircraft" mentioned in the first phrase may freely transit the exclusive
economic zone but may not overfly the territorial sea except when
exercising the rights of transit or archipelagic sea lanes passage. Key
words, then, in the first half of the exclusion eliminate the territorial
sea's innocent passage regime from its operation. The narrow scope of
248
the transit and archipelagic sea lanes passage restrictions; the
prohibitions against suspending, denying, impairing or hampering such
249
passage; and the overwhelming concern of the developing coastal
states to maintain maximum control over activities within their exclusive
250
economic zones all point to the additional elimination of the remaining
territorial waters comprising straits and archipelagic sea lanes from the




to reciprocity of exception, this conclusion balances and harmonizes
the two halves of the exclusion, making them co-equal in scope. Thus,
neither the maritime power for its military activities nor the coastal state
for its enforcement activities enjoys an advantage over the other in
electing this exception. Because the exception, if invoked, relates only
to disputes arising in the exclusive economic zone, those disputes
precipitated by instances of non-innocent passage of warships in the
252
territorial sea remain amenable to compulsory, binding resolution.
This is true even if both parties have elected the exception and applied
253
it to all four compulsory procedures. The principle of reciprocity
makes the military activities exception a risky option for both coastal
states and maritime powers, for it applies to the one ocean regime most
likely to generate disputes and, in the absence of binding peaceful
254
resolution machinery, most likely to result in the use of force.
Use of Defensive Force
The United Nations Charter allows "individual or collective
255
self-defense in the face of "armed attack." This instinct of
self-preservation *' flows from an overwhelming necessity, "leaving no
257
choice of means and no moment for deliberation." k" The defensive act
ICO
"must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it."
Although the decision to act in self-defense may be the prerogative of
the coastal state in the first instance, it raises the question of response,
and it may "afterwards be reviewed by the law in light of all the
259
circumstances."
Thus, use of force in relation to a warship's passage in the
territorial sea should be approached with extreme caution. Even under
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suspicious circumstances, until threat of attack becomes imminent, the
prudent course dictates following the special procedures applicable to
warships breaching coastal state regulations: a warning concerning the
improper behavior followed by using the minimal coercion necessary, for
example, an escort ship or aircraft, if the behavior persists. Only when
these measures fail should the question of armed force under the coastal
state's right of protection arise. Wise military strategy counsels against
fighting unnecessary battles; thus, force should be applied only when no
other alternative exists and only in the minimum degree demanded by the
circumstances. For use of force — even in perceived self-defense — if
excessive or unwarranted, invites self-defense in return. A warship
fired upon in the territorial sea may fire back and may be justified in
. . 260doing so.
Some commentators view the use of defensive force as encompassing
an even broader scope, that of asserting a right unlawfully denied.
"[I]f a state has a right which it is entitled to exercise and another
state wrongfully and forcibly persists in interfering with its exercise,
the first state is not bound to submit to the lawless use of force by the
second but may lawfully assert its right by the threat and use of
force." This view is embodied in the Corfu Channel decision.
This extension of the concept of permissible self-defense is
2fi3
controversial and fraught with danger. Although it describes
precisely the way in which the dialectic of claim and counter-claim
worked to shape the customary law, it partakes of an era when weapons
of limited destructive capability were controlled by a relatively small
number of national actors. As today's nuclear weaponry approaches
unlimited destructive power asymptotically and the number of national
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actors has vastly expanded, the process of ascertaining rights by
asserting force or meeting force with opposing force between or among
any of those actors risks escalation, intervention, ultimately world
conflict. Such risks should, if possible, be kept to a minimum.
The crux of this problem appears in the situation where both sides
resort to force to assert a "right" which the other has "unlawfully
denied," based upon differing interpretations — likely, but not neces-
sarily, politically or ideologically motivated — of factual data or legal
standards. Instances of alleged non-innocent passage could easily fit
this scenario. Each actor would justify by its subjective belief the
application of this extended self-defense rule to vindicate its view of the
situation. Where no compulsory and binding means exists to compel
decision of the disputed issue, only political means — the influence of
world opinion, outside intervention and the rational calculus of strategic
264
decision theory, — remain to constrain the escalation of hostilities,
and these means are far from certain to do so. It is suggested that in
the absence of a comprehensive and widely accepted law of the sea
treaty, use of force, particularly to ensure free navigation and innocent
passage rights, will continue to "be considered a useful and probably
ICC
effective method of securing [these] objectives." Only comprehensive
and widely accepted compulsory, peaceful dispute settlement procedures
can ensure against forceful handling of foreign warships passing through
26fi
the territorial sea. Identification of breaches and selection of appro-
priate measures depend upon the respective states' technical capabilities
and the individual judgments of their officials. The question at this
point being one of rule enforcement, it is important to consider the
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decisionmaking process involved in determing whether passage is
innocent or not.
Who decides?
Despite objective criteria, due to cultural, linguistic, ideological and
political differences, each state will likely develop its own subjective
interpretations of innocent passage rules and its own set of regulations,
which may, or may not, correspond to those of any other state. When
flag state and coastal state interpretations clash, the question arises,
who decides?
Initially, the commanding officer of a warship has the capability to
decide whether its passage shall be innocent or non-innocent, compliant
or non-compliant with coastal state regulations. He may operate under
orders in this regard, or he may have the latitude, within limits, to
exercise his own discretion. As a matter of national policy, he may, for
example, undertake non-innocent passage in portions of the high seas
claimed as territorial waters in excess of generally accepted limits.
Or he may engage in passage calculated to be innocent but non-compliant
in order to protest a coastal state regulation or practice which goes
beyond those his state views as permissible under the Conventions or
ICO
other rules of international law.
Absent a world ocean police force, each littoral State must police
and protect its own territorial waters. This involves, in the first
instance, as previously noted, recognizing a violation when it occurs,
and, in the second instance, deciding whether to take action concerning
it. Combining the observed facts of the warship's behavior, then, with
his knowledge — or lack thereof — concerning the law of innocent
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passage and applicable domestic regulations, some official of the coastal
state will next decide the question of innocence. As with the warship
commander, this official may have either strict orders or discretion
within limits concerning how to interpret the warship's behavior and in
what manner, if any, to respond.
The initial observer's perception will reflect a natural filtering
process in which certain perceived facts will be emphasized and others
discarded. The observer's likely communication of the "facts" to higher
authority for decision introduces additional opportunity for distortion of
the objective data. The accuracy of the information received will be no
greater than the product of the observer's perception, his ability to
communicate, and the fidelity of the means of communication. This
information, in turn, may pass through yet other layers of perception
and communication until it rises to the level of decisionmaking. Based
upon the communicated "facts," knowledge of the law and a host of
institutional considerations including national goals, foreign policy objec-
tives, internal organizational interests, standard operating procedures
269
and domestic political influences, the appropriate official or officials
will decide whether the warship's passage is innocent or not and what
measures, if any, should be taken. A message to this effect will then
travel back down through the layers of perception and communication to
be acted upon.
In view of the potential seriousness of any perceived act of non-
innocent passage, the perception-decisionmaking-execution process intro-
duces an uncomfortable margin for error. At one extreme the decision
regarding the character of passage and the appropriateness of sanctions
may be made by a lower level official, possibly a military officer in
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charge of a coastal defense sector, one step removed from the scene of
action, or even directly by a ship or aircraft commander at the scene.
At the other extreme, the information must be relayed to a national
leader for decision. In the first instance, although the facts may be
clearer, knowledge of the fine points of international law is wanting. As
the decision level rises to approach the latter case, the reverse occurs:
knowledge of the law becomes greater, but the "facts" may have
mutated.
Any decision, no matter how arrived at, must be made with an eye
toward its likely effects. Unless a great deal is known about the
internal decisionmaking processes of the opposing government, the most
likely approach in determining the course of action to pursue is to follow
270
the "rational actor" model. This theory of dealing with conflict
assumes "rational behavior . . . motivated by a conscious calculation of
advantages . . . that ... is based on an explicit and internally con-
271
sistent value system." The strategy of dealing with conflict under
this model is "concerned with constraining an adversary through his
272
expectation of the consequences of his actions." Following this
model, a flag state, through its warship commander, then, would under-
take non-innocent passage only if it determined that the benefits to be
273derived would outweigh any harm anticipated in response. For
example: 1) the trivial case, the warship completes its mission
undetected; or 2) if detected, it was not directly challenged due to the
coastal state's: a) operational inability to challenge it, b) concern not to
alienate the flag state, or c) belief that the threat of challenge to the
warship would be met by fulfillment of an implicit promise to meet force
with force — in which case, the biggest, newest, most efficient warship
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(assumed here to be that of the flag state) would likely prevail. Like-
wise, the coastal state can influence warship behavior at the outset by
making a credible threat: warships violating the maritime frontier
274
without permission will be subject to "appropriate measures."
Whether this threat is consistent with international law or not, state
275
practice shows that the world believes it. At the second stage, the
coastal state must calculate the warship's or flag state's probable
response to the selected measures and, further, the commander's or flag
state's estimate of the coastal state's likely reaction to its response.
The flag state in responding to the coastal state makes a similar
calculation, and so on.
Several lessons flow from this analysis. First, the decisionmaking
process in recognizing and responding to instances of non-innocent
passage reveals itself as both complex and contingent: complex in that
it may involve on both sides (though only one was discussed) a chain of
communication, interaction within the governmental structure of
competing organizational and personal power relationships, and the need
to harmonize contemplated action with standard operating procedures and
national objectives; and contingent in that it depends upon the accuracy
of perception and communication at each successive level, but most of all
upon the behavior of the adversary and the dual prospects of calculating
how the rational actor of a particular value system would respond and
how to deter an unfavorable response by altering the adversary's
expectation of the consequences of its own action. Second, the initial
determination of non-innocent passage, whether made actively by the flag
state or passively by the coastal state, precipitates a chain of reaction
and response decisions which are inexorably interdependent and which,
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if based upon inaccurate data or mistaken assumptions, carry significant
risks of conflict escalation.
Who then decides the question of non-innocent passage? Both do,
for if the rational actor theory provides an accurate description of
decisionmaking in the face of conflict, a prerequisite to each calculated
"move" is the assessment of the expected "counter-move." In just this
way do the interests and expectations of both parties enter into the
initial decision of non-innocent passage and into each successive decision
until the dispute terminates by voluntary agreement, binding decision,
or otherwise. Whether it be an intentional undertaking or a perceived
breach, prejudicial passage sets the stage on which the subsequent
action must be played out. Not all occurrences of prejudicial passage
will evoke response; likewise, some instances of innocent passage may be
mistaken. Overreaction, escalation, and intervention may all occur, but
behind them all lies the rational calculus of advantage and deference.
The value systems that undergird this calculus arise from the widely
varying interests of individual states. Consideration of those interests
will assist in determining how non-innocent passage has been and should
be dealt with in concrete cases.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION: CONFLICTING INTERESTS
OF COASTAL STATES AND MARITIME POWERS
Up to this point, the terms "coastal state," "flag state," and
"maritime power" have remained undefined. All states that border the
sea, of course, are coastal states, just as all states having ocean-going
vessels are flag states. These broad meanings apply in the legal context
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of differentiating coastal state and flag state rights and duties. In the
political context, however, a more restrictive use of these terms
emerges, a use defined by predominant national interest. In this
manner, "coastal states" focus primarily on national, jurisdictional
concerns, while maritime powers seek broader global goals frequently
associated with navigational freedoms. There exists a certain fuzziness
between the categories and considerable individual variations of specific
goals within. Every maritime power is also a coastal state and, as a
consequence, at some level must identify with many coastal state
7 7fi
interests. In such states there exists a complex balance of
competing, often conflicting, maritime interests frequently susceptible to
political pressures and manipulation. But not every coastal state is a
maritime power. Many are industrialized nations; more are not. In the
context of the negotiations leading to the 1982 Convention, a group of
277
self-identified "coastal-states" formed. The following summary of
interests regarding warship passage seeks to reflect a representative
view of the general common goals these states hold, while at the same
time incorporating within this view all coastal states (in the broad sense)
which do not otherwise consider themselves maritime powers.
As with its complement, the listing of nations which are "maritime
powers" is not exact. States with large merchant and fishing fleets,
major flags of convenience, major naval powers — these are all
candidates for membership. The nature of this study suggests that more
weight will be placed on the naval power aspect of maritime power
status. Thus follows a brief listing and discussion of the
warship-related interests of coastal states that are not maritime powers
278




The coastal state's interests regarding the presence of foreign
warships in its territorial waters include: sovereignty, security,
environmental and safety concerns, and avoidance of political or economic
pressures.
The coastal state's sovereignty interest involves several dimensions.
The lateral — or quantitative — dimension, territorial jurisdiction, seeks
to encompass all available territory and resources which the coastal state
279
'
may appropriate to the use and benefit of its inhabitants. Running
up against political boundaries of other states surrounding it on land,
the coastal state must turn toward the sea for expansion. Through a
system of zones and boundaries corresponding to its various levels of
jurisdictional concern, the coastal state claims exclusive rights to the
sea's living and mineral resources and and control over activities
conducted in it. A significant manifestation of the importance attached
to sovereign rights in the exclusive economic zone appears in the
jurisdictional limitations on compulsory dispute settlement that coastal
280
states obtained in the 1982 Convention. Customs, immigration, and
police functions all have to do with this type of sovereignty. The
vertical — or qualitative — dimension of sovereignty is stature, the
government's standing in the eyes of its populance and its prestige
among nations. A state's reaction to an unlawful intrusion by a foreign
vessel into its territory may tend either to raise or lower that state's
international reputation or credibility. Even wholly inoffensive
intrusions under color of custom or treaty right, might tend on this axis
to be viewed by some states as somehow diminishing a finite store of
national pride and dignity. In lieu of trying to prevent such lawful
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intrusions altogether, the coastal state concerned by such passage rights
would likely seek to minimize the level of intrusion and maximize its
exercise of control for the duration of each passage.
281
The security interest is closely related. It consists of a desire
to avoid intimidation or coercion by displays of force, to prevent sur-
282
prise attack from the sea, and to protect the coastal state's own fleet
and harbors. For this reason, the coastal state would argue, foreign
military operations should be prohibited in the territorial sea, for if they
were allowed, the coastal state not only would become more vulnerable to
intimidation through a show of naval might, but it would also have great
difficulty distinguishing routine fleet exercises from an impending
283 —
attack. The coastal state would want, in addition, specific
prohibitions from interference with its communication or defensive
systems and the ability to designate traffic schemes in order to channel
traffic away from any sensitive security areas and to facilitate the
•* • f •* 284monitoring of its movement.
Environmental and safety concerns include insuring adherence to
applicable health and safety laws to prevent disease, injury or property
damage; navigation routes and procedures designed to prevent collisions;
and anti-pollution practices to avoid oil spills or other marine disasters.
Avoidance of political or economic pressure results from applying
the same standards to the ships of all countries, without distinction.
The political benefits of maintaining an even-handed policy concerning
enforcement of prohibitions and regulations lies in freeing the coastal
2 85
state from the influence or intimidation of the major maritime powers.
Consistency and fairness of administration, as long as these remain
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domestically desirable goals, enhance a state's international reputation
for integrity and, hence, help to increase its stature among nations.
Of these four, sovereignty and security have remained the dominant




Foremost among the interests of the maritime nations — those with
large merchant and fishing fleets, but particularly those with large
navies — is freedom of the seas to insure unrestricted use and naviga-
287
tion for maximum naval mobility. Though often exercised far from
288
home shores, this is, in effect, a security interest. ' This is why
these nations have clung so tenaciously to the concept of a narrow
territorial sea, and why, when it appeared that extension of the
territorial sea was inevitable, they insisted upon unrestricted navigation
within economic zones outside the territorial sea and free transit through
289
straits and archipelagos within. In part this insistence grew from the
long-held belief that expansion of territorial seas would have the effect
of denying or altering access to scores of international straits around
290
the world. For the maritime powers, this would have curtailed naval
291
mobility and imparied security interests to an unacceptable degree.
Whether or not this view was correct, clearly the maritime nations have a
strong interest in preserving freedom of unrestricted navigation
throughout the world's oceans and unrestricted access to the world's
ports for their shipping, fishing fleets, and navies. Like concerns exist




Access to the resources of the sea and seabed also ranks high
among the interests of the maritime powers. The fishing fleets of the
world find their traditional fishing grounds increasingly encroached upon
292by coastal state claims. Deep sea mining companies have developed
293
technology to extract magnesium nodules from the ocean floor. The
United States government's decision to decline to sign the 1982 Conven-
254
tion due to an unacceptable seabed mining regime highlights the grave
concern with which some states dependent upon imports for these critical
materials view this interest. Together with access to resources, the
additional interests of "protection of the environment" and "promotion of
295
ocean knowledge" bear only indirectly on warship transit in the
territorial sea; nevertheless, they derive from the same motivating
force — freedom of the seas — which drives the navigational interest.
A stable and fair mechanism of conflict management and "maintenance of
a favorable legal order" round out general interests which bear on
*>• • 296warship transit.
The four major naval powers share certain naval missions to
297
effectuate these interests, among which strategic deterrence figures
prominently in each state's naval posture. Incidents of non-innocent
passage in the territorial sea, however, may threaten to impair the
future conduct of this mission by submarine forces.
Strategic Interests
Strategic and political interests include preserving the nuclear
balance and avoiding technological or tactical surprise. A major factor
298
in preserving the nuclear balance is the ballistic missile submarine.
Because nuclear deterence depends so heavily upon the undetectability of
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these submarines, the major naval powers have particularly pressed for
299
submerged transit through straits and archipelagos. As long as no
side can locate and threaten with destruction any substantial portion of
the others' ballistic missile carrying submarines, any aggressor runs
the risk of unacceptable retaliation in the event of a nuclear first
strike. Though one may question the sanity of a world organized
around the doctrine of strategic deterrence, policed by a hundred
mobile, submerged nuclear arsenals, it remains a fact of the nuclear age.
Until trust and cooperation in relations among nations replace suspicion
and devisiveness, everyone's best interests lie in keeping the strategic
missile submarines submerged as they transit the globe. Though they
may pass under straits and archipelagic waters, few, if any, will ever
venture into territorial waters, for their domain is the high seas, where
they can patrol undetected.
Other submarines pose different problems. Their missions vary
301
from tracking down missile submarines to gathering intelligence.
Avoiding technological and tactical surprises may involve this latter
function. It is likely that all naval powers which engage in gathering
intelligence by means of submerged submarines will have to consider
carefully whether the expected benefits to be derived from such activity
outweigh the serious risks to international peace and stability involved in
the face of the universal recognition of the validity of a twelve-mile
territorial sea.
If incidents of warship non-innocent passage occur frequently,
coastal states are likely to perceive them as abuses by the maritime
powers of their innocent passage rights. This perception may lead to
two undesirable results. First, it may make the coastal state more ready
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to defend forcibly against perceived threats to its sovereignty. Second,
it will prompt the coastal state to take measures to resist transit near its
shores, including through straits which lie within its territorial sea.
Coastal state reaction is likely to be manifested against submarines, the
principal vehicles of covert operation, which are the most likely —
because the least obvious — violators. Such a reaction probably would
not distinguish between the deep-water fleet ballistic-missile submarines
and those employed in coastal intelligence gathering and surveillance;
instead, all would be seen as tools of superpower aggression and domina-
tion. Such a stance on the part of coastal states would make it more
difficult for the naval powers to preserve free transit rights in any
future law of the sea negotiation or renegotiation. Especially at risk
would be continued submerged straits transit rights for strategic
submarine forces.
Examples of Non-Innocent Passage
Drawn from historic incidents but treated hypothetically , the follow-
ing four examples serve briefly to illustrate some of the problems and
questions likely to arise during various alleged cases of non-innocent
passage: submerged submarines, electronic intelligence activities, denial
of straits transit, and excessive maritime claims.
Submerged Submarines in the Territorial Sea: The Swedish
Experience
The submerged submarines off the Swedish coast are most likely
sent to gather intelligence. Can we doubt that their commanders know
where they are and what rules apply? If it were only a case of inadver-
tence, of straying into the territorial sea, the submarine would surface
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when warned by a depth grenade. Such signal procedures are well
302known to all submarine officers. But these submarines dove or
evaded each time they were detected. Due to the volume of incidents
303
and the proximity of two large Soviet submarine fleets, there is
reason to believe that most, if not all, of these "unidentified contacts"
304belonged to the flag state of the grounded one. Queried concerning
the presence of weapons aboard the grounded submarine, the Soviets
replied in a manner which neither confirmed nor denied their
305
presence. When the Swedish press speculated that the more recent
submarines belonged to the Soviet Union, again, although both West
Germany and the United States denied ownership, no denial came from
the East; rather, Tass issued a statement of diversion, speculating that
Sweden had invented the incident to strain relations. Had they not been
Soviet submarines one might well imagine that the denial would have been
immediate and uncategorical. Suppose the identity of the 1982 submarine
had been discovered. And suppose further, despite the rhetoric of
Tass, it proved to be Soviet. With two-thirds of its submarine fleet
30fi
having access to the North Atlantic, this would not be a totally
307
unwarranted assumption. Such a revelation, had it occurred, would
undoubtedly have proved a substantial embarrassment to a state that has
308
long claimed a twelve-mile territorial sea, required thirty days prior
309
permission for warships to transit it, and officially adopted a policy
of attacking any submerged submarines it detects in its territorial
waters. How could its leader avoid responsibility for and humiliation
by the intrusion? How much would it diminish his own and his
government's credibility in the eyes of the world? Such an incident
could only increase world tensions. And it would certainly undercut the
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pretense that the Soviet reservation to article 23 of the 1958
31
1
Convention could have any further vitality: by its own action the
312Soviet Union would have derogated its policy of prior permission.
Swedish action concerning the submarines has showed both restraint
and grave concern. Depth charging to force the submarines to surface
rather than to sink them, the Swedish Navy has taken care to fire its
explosives at a prudent distance from the submarines' hulls. Likewise,
it detained the grounded submarine and its crew only long enough to
finish its investigation of the matter. Both of these, the latter coupled
with diplomatic protest, go beyond the warning and expulsion measure
into the realm of necessary steps to prevent non-innocent passage.
While a submarine may transit submerged without impairing its
innocence, the presumption dictates against innocence in the case of one
313found lurking in the territorial sea. If in addition to the Con-
ventions' requirement, flag state law provides that foreign submarines
must surface in its territorial sea, the warship should, at the risk of
making its government appear hypocritical or heavy-handed, strictly
observe the same practice in the waters of another sovereign state.
To summarize in view of our criteria of analysis, the decision for
submerged intrusion in these cases came first from the flag state,
through the submarines' commanders. Swedish authorities appear to
have regarded the instances at the outset as breaches of the inter-
national rule requiring submarines to navigate on the surface; they,
therefore, utilized internationally recognized naval procedures to warn
the submarines that they were in territorial waters and should surface.
This failing, they attempted with depth charges to expel the intruders.
Only in those instances involving direct threats to their secret naval
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bases did they take the further measures allowed by the right of pro-
315
tection in cases of non-innocent passage. This right, as embodied in
the Conventions, equates to the customary right of self-defense. Having
found by objective analysis the submarine's continued submerged
presence near a top-secret naval base not be be an exercise of innocent
passage through the territorial sea, Sweden was justified in applying the
"? 1 fi
minimal force necessary to protect its security. Owing to the
difficulty of identifying with certainty the state of origin of a submerged
contact, there is little else Sweden can do at this point save protest
informally through the media and apply necessary measures of
self-defense in an effort to ward off or to identify the intruders. For
the major naval powers, the submerged submarine inside territorial
waters is a time bomb: sooner or later one will be trapped or, worse,
sunk, and the undeniable truth of its identity will become known to all.
Electronic Intelligence Gathering Ships: Pueblo
, et al.
Within the last two decades three United States warships suffered
attack while on intelligence gathering missions: the U.S.S. Maddox , by
317
torpedo boats off the coast of North Vietnam, the U.S.S. Liberty
,
strafed by Israeli aircraft and attacked by torpedo boats during the
31 8
seven-day war, and the U.S.S. Pueblo , seized by the North
319
Koreans. Although all were reportedly in international waters at the
320
time of attack, and thus, exercising a permissible use of the high
321
seas, *" in a world governed by the new Convention, had they been
stationed inside the territorial sea, their intelligence-gathering conduct
would have been non-innocent, thereby enabling the coastal state to take
322
"necessary steps" to prevent such conduct. In such case, since they
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were warships, the prudent course suggests that the first step in each
instance should have been a warning to cease the activity or to leave the
territorial sea. Expulsion could then follow if the behavior persisted,
but armed attack in the first instance unless responding to prior attack
323
would appear to violate international law. Possibly attack could be
justified in defense of a right forcibly (by a warship) infringed, but in
this event, the minimal force necessary was exceeded. A further
explanation of the actual result in these cases present itself, however.
All three confrontations share a common element: In each case there
existed a de facto state of war between the attacker and another state,
and in two of the instances the United States had thrown its support
behind the attacker's opponent. The attackers, therefore, may not have
viewed these as strictly peacetime incidents. In contrast to the
excessive force illustrated here, request to leave or escort out of the
territorial sea coupled with diplomatic protest in the more serious cases
should suffice in most instances of intelligence-gathering by surface
vessels.
These cases are instructive in several respects. First they
highlight how differing territorial sea claims can lead to conflict. The
United States recognized only a three-mile territorial sea at the time,
324 325
while the attackers recognized twelve-mile " and six-mile claims.
The recent declaration of a twelve-mile claim for North Vietnam may have
figured in the warship's presence — and the United States
acknowledgment of it — within eleven miles of the coast shortly before it
one
was fired on. The second lesson is that although intelligence
gathering by means of seaborne, airborne and satellite platforms is a
permissible and accepted — even desirable — use; nevertheless, its
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practice is likely to appear threatening and hostile to the coastal
32 8
state. Although the 1982 Convention purports to retain high seas
freedoms in the exclusive economic zone, it remains to be seen if under
a regime governed by the Convention coastal states will attempt to
restrict intelligence activities conducted by surface ships or submerged
submarines from outside the territorial sea but inside the adjacent
329
economic zone. A dispute over this question may prove difficult to
resolve, because of the military and law enforcement activities
330
exception. If the maritime power has invoked the exception for all
compulsory procedures and the coastal state interferes with the military
activity, the flag state cannot bring the dispute to a compulsory process
without the coastal state's consent. However, it appears that under the
same facts, but with the coastal state having filed the blanket exception,
the flag state could, indeed, initiate a compulsory procedure. Whereas
the military half of the exclusion is not subject to qualification, the law
enforcement half appears to apply only to enforcement activities regard-
ing marine scientific research and fishing, but not to those relating to
332high seas freedoms. Thus, it appears that unless the flag state files
a blanket military activities exception, it may initiate a compulsory and
binding settlement procedure whenever its high seas freedoms are
unreasonably challenged or denied by the coastal state within the
exclusive economic zone. Likewise, unless the flag state has excepted
all compulsory methods, the coastal state can compel compulsory settle-




Denial of Straits Transit: Icebreakers in the Northeast
Passage
Soviet denial of passage in 1965 to the United States Coast Guard
icebreaker Northwind and in 1967 to the icebreakers Eastwind and Edisto
333during their attempted transits of the Northeast Passage was illegal
334
under customary law, the Corfu Channel Case , and both Conventions.
The Vil'kitskiy Strait connects two parts of the high seas, or, at a mini-
335
mum, a part of the high seas with a territorial sea, but the Soviet
jot
Union claims that the strait lies inside its maritime frontier. At the
time of the passage attempts, the 1958 Convention, expanding upon the
Corfu Channel Case , which held that innocent passage through inter-
337
national straits does not require prior permission, had established a
non-suspendable right of transit through those straits described as
Vil'kitskiy, above. The differing Soviet interpretation of the coastal
state regulatory provision of this Convention has already been
338
mentioned. Because they technically fit the definition of warships,
the icebreakers were denied passage based upon a 1960 law protecting
339
state borders. The Soviets protested the attempted passage in 1965,
and the United States protested the denial of passage in 1967, due to
the Soviet requirement of thirty days prior authorization for passage of
. . 340
warships.
The 1982 Convention vindicated the Western interpretation of its
predecessor that any coastal state requirement of prior authorization or
notice was contrary to its terms. Under both Conventions' standards,
innocent passage through Vil'kitskiy Strait should not have been denied.
In view of the light the 1982 Convention sheds on interpreting the 1958
document, the Soviet Union will find it increasingly difficult to defend
its strident position on the inviolability of national maritime frontiers,
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particularly since it participated in drafting the new Convention. Even
moreso, should the Soviet Union become a party to the new Convention,
it will find that current interpretation of the prior authorization
requirements of its Statute on the Protection of the State Border fly in
the face of the clear prohibitions against infringing or denying innocent
passage in the territorial sea or transit passage through international
straits.
The icebreaker incidents illustrate the protest of a coastal state
regulation, perceived to be unlawful, through passage calculated to be
innocent but not in compliance with the regulation. The Soviets decided
passage in each case would violate Soviet frontiers and would be met by
341
"appropriate measures." Their passage refused under threat of
force, the icebreakers would have been justified in forcefully asserting
342
the right unlawfully denied. Instead, political considerations pre-
vailed: a diplomatic protest was lodged, and the icebreakers turned
back. Several features of this exchange stand out. First, though
operated under the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard
icebreakers were, nevertheless, considered warships because they fit the
technical description and carried armament. Second, the law applied to
deny passage dealt with "previous authorization" to "pass through terri-
343
torial and enter internal sea waters"; no provision explicitly
addressed transiting the territorial sea without entering internal
waters or passing through straits located within the territorial sea.
Third, desiring to avoid confrontation, the rival powers communicated
their positions diplomatically rather than testing each other's resolve by
forcing the issue. Finally, with the Soviet Navy's new global emphasis,
the principle of reciprocity will likely encourage the harmonization of
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Soviet territorial sea practice regarding warships with the prevailing
344
rules of other nations and of international law. If for some
unforeseen reason this does not occur, the question of freedom of transit
through the Northeast Passage appears well suited for international
arbitration or adjudication, particularly under the new law of the sea
dispute settlement procedures, should the Convention enter into force
345
and the disputants become parties to it. Because the application of
the military activities exception to international straits is doubtful, it
appears that either party could initiate a compulsory procedure, any
extant military activities exception notwithstanding.
Excessive Maritime Claims: The Gulf of Sidra
On August 19, 1981, two F-14 fighter aircraft, from the U.S.S.
Nimitz (CVN-68), conducting range clearance for the second day of a
two-day missile exercise, were fired upon by two Lybian SU-22
interceptors approximately 60 nautical miles from land over the Gulf of
Sidra, a 300-mile wide pocket of the Mediterranean Sea adjacent to the
346
Lybian coast. In the ensuing battle, both Lybian planes were shot
347down. Stung by the defeat, Lybia strongly protested encroachment
of its sovereign territory, for it considers the Gulf of Sidra to be an
348
historic bay and, therefore, part of its internal waters. Since
Colonel Khadaffi announced this policy in October 1973, the United
States Sixth Fleet has resisted this encroachment upon the freedom of
navigation in the Mediterranean Sea by conducting periodic naval
349
exercises in the Gulf.
This scenario presents an instance of resistance to a perceived
unlawful territorial claim by conduct that would, if the claim were valid,
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constitute non-innocent passage — incursion by naval aircraft launched
350from a nearby aircraft carrier. Judging from its reaction, Lybia
interpreted the fighters' presence as non-innocent, but used excessive
force in attempting to assert its claim of sovereignty to the Gulf and the
airspace above it. Given the long-time United States naval presence in
the Mediterranean and the tempo of its training operations there, it can
hardly be imagined that Lybian leaders could seriously have believed
that two fighter aircraft performing range clearance for the second day
of a publicized missile shoot — miles oft the coast — posed any threat
whatsoever to the territorial integrity of the Lybian mainland. The
prudent approach of the Lybians to the American fighters, then, would
have been to intercept them, warn them by radio or visual means to
351
leave the area and escort them to the limit of claimed jurisdiction.
Given the initial use of force by the Lybian aircraft, the U.S. fighter
crews were justified, both under the Corfu Channel rationale and by the
doctrine of self-defense, in resisting the forceful and unlawful denial of
their right to free navigation and operation over the high seas. It is an
altogether different question whether, being justified, they should have,
352
nevertheless, attempted to avoid confrontation. " Had they first been
warned but resisted any escort attempt, the Lybian aircraft could have
used this same rationale forcefully to repel the American planes, with the
caution that if the "right" they were enforcing proved later to be
unlawful they would bear international responsibility for the incident.
The same qualification, of course, applies to the actions of the American
fighters. The result is that both sides believed they were justified
politically, if not legally, in using force to assert a right being
derogated by the other. The decisions to attack and to counter-attack
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when fired upon must have derived ultimately from the rational calculus
of each side. In hindsight, we may observe that the rational actor
parameters employed by Lybia in deciding to initiate the attack were
either lacking or grossly mistaken. Either they miscalculated U.S.
353
resolve to resist encroachments of the seas, or they overestimated
their own fighters' capabilities. Although the American pilots may have
been able successfully to evade further salvos, they were faced with a
dilemma. To retreat would have weakened U.S. resistance to the Lybian
claim. To remain risked their lives and aircraft. In the high-speed
world of negotiation by air-to-air missiles, the only viable alternative for
the American fighters was self-defense.
Dispute settlement under the 1982 Convention involves a different
exception in this instance, that for historic bays. It provides an
intermediate step, compulsory conciliation in the event the parties cannot
354
voluntarily agree to a settlement within a reasonable time. The
parties must then negotiate an agreement based upon the conciliation
355
commission report. If conciliation fails, "the parties shall, by mutual
consent, submit the question to one of the procedures provided for in
o c c
section 2, unless the parties otherwise agree." In dealing with a
militaristic, saber-rattling government such as Lybia's, one that supports
the cause of international terrorism and has massed its forces to invade
neighboring Sudan, respect for international legality is likely to carry
little persuasive force. By the same measure, the United States may be
reluctant to risk the adverse decision of this issue by an arbitral panel
or by the Law of the Sea Tribunal, which will be dominated by
357
third-world countries, of which Lybia is one. Thus, prospects for
an early solution to this problem are low. For the present, the process
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of claim and counterclaim shaping the practice of states to build inter-
national custom holds the most promise — but also the the most
danger — for settling Lybia's disputed "historic" claim to the Gulf of
Sidra.
TOWARD THE FUTURE
The foregoing examples represent only a preview of non-innocent
passage incidents likely to occur in the future. The 1982 Convention
goes far in resolving previous uncertainties of interpretation and in
providing a helpful framework for judging innocence or its opposite.
Even if the new Convention never enters into force, its innocent passage
rules carry the weight of international consensus as standards for inter-
preting the 1958 Convention. But more is needed. That "more"
involves a transformation of understanding, of will, and of action.
First, we need to purge from our understanding of the concept of
sovereignty its historically recent overlay of absolute and unlimited
power inherent in each state. By displacing the legal underpinnings of
sovereign authority with might, Hobbes, in effect, removed sovereignty
"from the sphere of jurisprudence, where it had its origin and where it
properly belongs, and . . . import[ed] it into political science, where it
358
has ever since been a source of confusion." The shift toward locat-
ing sovereignty in the state as a juridic person rather than in the
person of an individual ruler (or in "the people" of a democracy) has
359
added to the confusion. "For if sovereignty means absolute power,
and if states are sovereign in that sense, they cannot at the same time
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be subject to law. . . . [I]f the premises are correct there Is no escape
from the conclusion that International law Is nothing but a delusion."
Instead, we need to recognize that the power to make laws, the essential
manifestation of sovereignty, must be subordinate to some higher laws,
including the fundamental laws of the state that define the sovereign
361
power, the law of reason, and the law that is common to all nations.
The law of reason or of nature signified "the sum of those princi-
ples which ought to control human conduct, because founded in the very
OCT
nature of man as a rational and social being." Borrowing this jus
naturale concept from the Greek Stoics, the Romans eventually amal-
gamated it with their practical and progressive jus gentium , a body of
rules observed to be common to all nations, which were "regarded as so
simple and reasonable that they must be recognized everywhere and by
everyone." The two concepts became synonymous as two sides of the
same coin. This "law of nations," comprising the law of reason and the
law that is common to all nations, forms the core of our modern inter-
national law.
The concept of absolute state sovereignty based on might is
outmoded. Although still readily apparent in relations among nations,
the "might-makes-right" theory of international relations has decreased
in importance and legitimacy. It partakes of a bygone era where war
after war redefined political boundaries and alliances and where claim
and counterclaim shaped expectations in the relations among states. But
with the demise of colonial empires, the growth of global Institutions and
the advent of nuclear weapons, war has diminished in its centrality as a
normal instrument of foreign policy. Increasingly, positive international
law results from reason, argument and accommodation rather than from
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force and assertion of right. While the more immediate and certain
method of consensus in the shaping of international obligations has
moved to the fore, custom and the general principles of law recognized
365by civilized nations still play important roles in international law.
For the "ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man,
whether he is a single individual or whether he is associated with other
men in a state, is constrained, in so far [sic] as he is a reasonable
being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of
"3C.C.
the world in which he has to live." Clearly, then, our thinking
about sovereignty must include both the independence and the
367
interdependence of nations.
The second transformation — that of national will — follows closely
on the heels of the first; it would require acceptance of the international
rule of law as the governing standard in all relations among nations.
Respect for international legality can only strengthen certainty in those
relations and ease international tensions. Merely understanding this
principle is not enough; it must become the conscious motivating force
behind the foreign policy of all states. Subordination of national
sovereignty to the international rule of law embodies a paradox: one
must give in order to gain. By joining with all other nations in giving
up the "rights" to make war, to threaten its neighbors, to hold others
as nuclear hostages, or to disobey rules it finds inconvenient, each
national government gains for itself and its people a stability, pre-
dictability, and peace in its international relations which it could never
guarantee by itself.
In the context of this study, respect for national sovereignty and
international order, in short, for the rule of law, should mean the
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elimination of willful violations of territorial waters. But it likewise
means a willingness to resist those unlawful violations and encroachments
which do occur. When compliance fails, the offended party must take
those measures — in accordance with law — which are best calculated to
result in an acceptable solution, one which will repair the harm done and
restore the integrity of the international legal order. At the same time,
it must be realized that there will be some insoluble conflicts in
international law, because they are political, not legal.
Finally, transformed understanding and will mean nothing without
action to implement them. It is particularly incumbent upon the major
powers in each sphere of influence to assume a leadership role in
promoting respect for international law. For maritime nations, this
includes both setting an example of compliance by the exercise of
restraint and strict observance of rules in order to foster coastal state
trust and cooperation, and maintaining the will to continue to enforce
rights against illegitimate claims while at the same time working to
negotiate or otherwise peacefully to establish uniform and universal
standards. For coastal states, such leadership involves even-handed
enforcement of reasonable regulations. Leadership does not mean
bossing; it means direct, active and concerned participation — together





The foreign warship's right of innocent passage through territorial
waters forms the cornerstone of modern naval mobility. This right
developed historically as the practical response to ocean commerce among
nations in an era when merchant vessels remained undifferentiated from
warships. It enabled them to pass between the high seas and their
ports of trade through the sovereign, marginal sea protected by cannon
fire from the shore. Over the centuries, despite competing national
claims to various degrees of control over the seas, this usage solidified
into a rule of customary law, which, within the last century and amid
much controversy, began to assimilate passage of warships under the
general right. Judicial decision and early codification attempts sought to
define the quality and limits of warship transit within the territorial sea
as partaking either of a right or of mere comity. The fruits of these
codification efforts reveal themselves finally in the comprehensive naviga-
tional rules of the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea.
Building upon the customary innocent passage right, the Convention
establishes between a state's internal waters and its economic zone,
where high seas navigational freedoms prevail, separate transit regimes
for the territorial sea and broader, more flexible ones for international
straits, and newly-recognized archipelagic waters. But these transit
rights are contingent to a greater or lesser degree upon the behavior of
the vessels exercising them. In the territorial sea, passage which is not
innocent invites sanction. Who decides the question of innocence and
the level of any resulting sanction is the crux of the problem of non-
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innocent passage. Herein lie the uncharted waters. These waters may
now appear more familiar, but they are no less fraught with danger.
Judging the quality of warship passage involves recognizing non-
innocent passage when it occurs and determining an appropriate
response. Recognition, in turn, requires combining accurate factual
data with the appropriate legal standards to facilitate the decisionmaking
process. Such decisions — partly legal, partly factual, nearly always
heavily political — result in large measure from a rational calculus which
includes simultaneous, unilateral consideration of the interests and values
of both actors. Those values, in turn, are likely to reflect the govern-
ment's identification as a developing or developed nation, a coastal state
or a maritime power. Coupled with internally-generated institutional
biases and political pressures, these values and goals shape a decision-
making process that is both complex and contingent.
Broad options exist for sanction and peaceful resolution of disputes.
The new Convention steps beyond traditional means by requiring the
parties to attempt to resolve disputes peacefully, through means of their
own choosing, and that failing, it provides a flexible but compulsory
framework for achieving binding decisions. Insofar as these compulsory
procedures remove dispute resolution from the realm of force, they
protect less powerful nations from the political and economic pressures of
more powerful nations and they strengthen certainty and trust in inter-
national dealings and confidence in and respect for the international legal
te
order. To the extent that they do not, they foster inderminancy of
right, hostility and disintegration of international legality.
Innocent passage is a vestige of a bygone era. It grew from the
dialectic of claim and counterclaim in a world of few powerful actors and
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infinite resources. That world has vastly changed. Modern "cannons"
span continents, not leagues. World resources are, after all, limited.
And modern notions of sovereignty threaten to re-divide the seas into a
checkerboard of national domains. In such a world with vastly more
actors pursuing a broader diversity of interests, the slow dialectic of
custom has given way to the speedier dialectic of consensus. The ink is
hardly dry on the new Convention, but even if it never enters into
force, the very process of reaching agreement has inalterably shaped the
law beyond the bounds of the 1958 Convention. For such a world, the
uncharted waters of non-innocent passage stand as a warning.
The problem of non-innocent passage in the territorial sea ripples
far beyond the twelve-mile bound. Its concentric circles spread outward
through seas and oceans to wash all the shores of the planet. The
reasons for non-innocent passage lie not in the breadth of the territorial
sea nor even in its juridical character; rather, they lie in the relentless
competition of national sovereignties sparked by suspicion and alarm over
other states' political institutions or social values which differ from one's
own. Until the leaders of all nations order their actions from the under-
standing that humankind is huddled closely together on a tiny life-raft
adrift in the vast ocean of galaxies, the problem of submarines lurking




1. "Whiskey" is the international phonetic alphabet equivalent of the
letter W; the appelation follows the NATO classification system for
Soviet-made submarines.
2. The Times (London), Nov. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 2; kj. Nov. 4, at 1,
col. 6; Le Monde, Oct. 30, 1981, at 4, col. 5. Captain of the
1,000-ton diesel submarine No. 137, Lieutenant Commander (Captain
of Third Rank) Anatoly M. Cushin, told Swedish authorities he ran
aground "after problems with his rudder and radar in bad
weather." The Times (London), Nov. 6, 1981, at 1, col. 2; id.
Nov. 5, at 28, col. 1; \d. Oct. 29, at 1, col. 7. Compare NT?.
Times, Nov. 7, 1981, at 3, col. 4 (identifying the captain as
Lieutenant Commander Pyotr Gushin) with id. Nov. 3, at 1, col. 5
(correcting the captain's name). Questioned" by Swedish
investigators, Captain Cushin later implicated a faulty gyrocompass.
The official version from Tass maintained that the submarine
strayed off course "in poor visibility and with malfunctioning
navigation equipment." Due to the depth of the submarine's
penetration into territorial waters and the difficulty of navigating
through the Karlskrona archipelago, Swedish authorities rejected
this explanation. Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1981, at 48; The Times
(London), Nov. 5, 1981, at 28, col. 1; jd. Nov. 3, at 1, col. 4.
3. The Times (London), Nov. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 4; id. Oct. 29, at 1,
col. 7; Le Monde, Nov. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 3; \d. T3ct. 31, at 3,
col. 4.
4. The Times (London), Oct. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 4.
5. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1981, at A3, col. 1.
6. Weapons experts believe that the uranium 238 isotope, itself unsuit-
able for nuclear weapons, is used to shield nuclear tipped torpedoes
or possibly SSN3 "Shaddock" cruise missiles. Newsweek, Nov. 16,
1981, at 48; The Times (London), Nov. 6, at 1, col. 2. Queried
about the presence of nuclear weapons aboard the submarine, the
Soviet Government replied, "(T]he submarine carries, as do all
naval vessels at sea, the necessary weapons and ammunition ....
However, . . . this has nothing to do with the circumstances
surrounding the unintentional intrustion by the submarine into
Sweden's territorial waters." N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1981, at 1, col.
5. A more complete text of the reply appears in Le Monde, Nov.
7, 1981, at 4, col. 3.
7. The Times (London), Nov. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 4. The newspaper
accounts reveal two possible targets for intelligence gathering. The
restricted area where the submarine ran aground is "rumored to be
one of the West's most powerful and advanced posts for spying on
Soviet communications systems." N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 1981, at 1,
col. 5. And the Swedish Navy was conducting secret tests of a
new anti-submarine torpedo on the same day the submarine ran
-69-

aground only six miles away. The Times (London), Nov. 5, 1981,
at 28, col. 1.
8. Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1981, at 48.
9. The Times (London), Nov. 7, at 4, col. 4.
10. ]d. Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1981, at 48.
11. "The Swedish Navy makes regular sightings of unidentified
submarines
. . .
." The Times (London), Oct. 30, 1981, at 1, col.
4. Swedish territorial waters were reportedly violated thirteen
times in 1980 by vessels of NATO and Warsaw Pact nations. Le
Monde, Oct. 30, 1981, at 4, col. 5.
12. Le Monde, Oct. 30, 1981, at 4, col. 5; The Times (London), Oct.
30, 1981, at 1, col. 4. Professor O'Connell recounts four earlier
encounters with foreign submarines in Swedish territorial waters
occurring in October 1966. O'Connell, Innocent Passage of
Warships , 7 Thesaurus Acroasium 405, 450 (1977).
13. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1982, at A3, col. 1; The Times (London),
Oct. 5, 1982, at 6, col. 5.
14. The Times (London), Oct. 12, 1982, at 7, col. 7; ki. Oct. 7, at 1,
col. 6; N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1982, at 5, col. 1; jd. Oct. 8, at A3,
col. 4; id. Oct. 7, at A3, col. 4. As with the earlier incident, the
Swedish~fJavy detected a second submarine well inside its territorial
waters and near the northern exit of Haarsfjaerden Bay, where the
first submarine was trapped. Id. Oct. 9, at 5, col. 1; jd. Oct. 8,






N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1982, at A3, col. 4. Soviet, Polish and
West German submarines were known to be operating in the Baltic.
Both West Germany and the United States denied ownership of the
trapped submarine. Id. Oct. 6, at A3, col. 1. The Soviet press
agency Tass speculated" that the incident may be "a deliberate
invention seeking to shatter trust and traditionally normal relations
between the U.S.S.R. and the Scandinavian countries." jd. Oct.
7, at A3, col. 4. Reported sightings of unidentified submarines in
Swedish territorial waters during 1982 totaled over fifty at the time
of this incident. Id. Oct. 9, at 5, col. 1; The Times (London),
Oct. 5, 1982, at 6~col. 5.
16. A. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon History (1890).
Concerning Mahan's continuing influence, see Etzoid, Is Mahan Still
Valid? , U.S. Naval Inst. Proc, Aug. 1980, at 38 and Pandolte,
Soviet Seapower in Light of Mahan's Principles , Id . at 44.
17. "I . . . presume that naval mobility remains desirable, and that we
should continue to pursue policies that would lead to its
maximization." Clingan, The Next Twenty Years of Naval Mobility
U.S. Naval Inst. Proc, May 1980, at 82. hor a listing ot these
policies and the naval missions developed to accomplish them, see
-70-

Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century
(J. George, ed. , 1978); M. Janis, Sea Power and the Law of the
Sea (1976); U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research
Service, Soviet Oceans Development (1976); Eberle, The Royal
Navy
,
U.S. Naval Inst. Proc, Aug. 1980, at 26; MccGuire, The
Rationale for the Developement of Soviet Seapower , id. May 1980, at
155; Polmar, Their Missions and Tactics , id. Oct. 19~82, at 34;
West, A Fleet'for the Year 2000: Future Force Structure
,
jd. May
1980, at 66; West, Planning tor the Navy's Future , idT~OctT 1979,
at 26. For a comparison of major power naval missions and
interests in various theatres, see also Baker, Sixth Fleet Update
,
id. Sept. 1980, at 52; Swarztrauber, The Potential Battle of the
Atlantic , id. May 1979, at 108; Tarpey, A Strategic Analysis of
"
Northwest~Asia and the Northwest Pacific
,
id. May 1980, at 106.
Concerning rivalry to control the seas, see
-
Edward, Soviet
Expansion and Control of the Sea-Lanes
,
jd. Sept. 1980, at 46.
18. United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature
,
Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.T.S. , U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (7
Oct. 1982) reprinted in 21 Int'CTegal Materials 1261 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as 1982 Convention].
19. See , e.g. , Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea , 58
Foreign Aff. 902, 914-15 (1980) and Law ot the Sea: Navigation and
Other Traditional National Security Considerations , 19 San Diego L.
Rev. 553, 555, 576 (1982).
20. See Remarks of Ambassador James L. Malone, U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference (April 30, 1982), Press Release USUN 25 (82);
Statement of Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., U.N. Law of the Sea
Conference (Dec. 9, 1982) at 2, U.N. DOC A/CONF.62/PR.192
(1982). For a summary of the concerns which rendered the
Convention unnacceptable to the United States, see the statements
of President Regan (Jan. 24, 1982) and Ambassador Malone (Feb.
23, 1982) reprinted in U.S. Dep't of State, Law of the Sea ,
Current Policy No. 371 (Jan. -Feb. 1982).
21. Whatever the future of the 1982 Convention, its articles defining
"prejudicial acts" and the limits of coastal state regulatory authority
elaborate controlling provisions of the 1958 Convention, infra note
22. As non-binding expressions of international consensus, these
articles will carry significant weight as aids in interpreting what
the earlier, less precise formulations mean.
22. Three other divisions of the seas recognized under conventional law
and state practice preserve traditional high sea freedoms: the
contigious zone, the continental shelf, and the exclusive economic
zone. See, respectively, Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contigious Zone, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter
cited as 1958 Convention]; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 3, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.




23. See , e.g. , Swayze, Negotiating a Law of the Sea , U.S. Naval Inst.
"Proc.TTuly 1980, at 33, 35-37.
24. J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 195>27-28, ; 304-05 (6th ed. 1963);
H. Grotius, Mare liberum (1608) (Magoffin translation of 1633 ed.
1916). Grotius founded his arguments upon "a primary rule . . .
the spirit of which is self-evident and immutable, to wit: Every
nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to trade with
it." Id. at 7. 1 D. O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 2,
9-18
~T"l 982) . For a detailed history of the territorial sea, see
Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters , 20 Am. J. Int'l
L. 465 (1926); Florsheim, Territorial Sea, 3000 Year Old Questions
,
36 J. Air L. Com. 73 (1970); and O'Connell, The Judicial Nature of
the Territorial Sea , 45 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 303 (1971).
25. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 194-95.
26. H. Grotius, supra note 24, chaps ll-VII.
27. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 305.
28. ]d. at 202-04.
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 271.
31. jd. at 260.
32. C. van Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris Dissertatio 44 (2d. ed.
1744) (Magoffin translation 1964): "Wherefore on the whole it seems
a better rule that the control of the land [over the seas] extends
as far as a cannon will carry; for that is as far as we seem to have
both command and possession."
33. D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 261.
34. G. Masee, Le Droit commercial dans ses rapports avec le droit de
gens (1844); The controversy over this distinction continues.
Shortly after the end of World War II, a respected authority wrote
that the practice of states still appeared to agree with the
possessory view. 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law § 185 (7th
Lauterpacht ed. 1948).
35. 1 L. Oppenheim, supra note 34, § 188.
36. For an account of this filtering process through the commentators,
state practice and international conferences, see O'Connell, supra
note 12, at 409-445 (1977).
37. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 237; D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at
273; Pharand, Innocent Passage in the Arctic , 6 Canadian Y.B.
Int'l L. 3, 11-12 (1968).
-72-

38. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
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n.116.
87. Pharand, supra note 37, at 12.
88. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
89. Concerning the difference between territorial and internal waters,
see supra text accompanying notes 36 & 37.
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moved to part III.
101. See infra text accompanying note 170.
102. See infra text accompanying note 173.
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warships. The Soviet Government has adopted a policy of "hot
pursuit" for violations of their maritime frontiers. Salupuri, supra
note 84, at 226. This implies that "necessary steps" to prevent
innocent passage into Soviet waters may occur outside the territorial
sea.
113. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 25(3). The basis for
suspension may include "weapons exercise."
111. Id. art. 30. The new formulation adds the word "immediately" to
th"e 1958 provision. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
115. "[A] right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall
exist in those waters." 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 8(2)
(emphasis added).
116. 1 E. Bruel, International Straits: A Treatise on International Law
202 (1947). On the right of passage through international straits,
see Cundick, supra note 53, at 107; Deddish, The Right of Passage
by Warships Through International Straits , 24 JAG J. 79 (1970);
Grandison & Meyer, International StraitsT" Global Communications,
and the Evolving Law of the Sea , 8 Vand. J. Transnt'l L. 393
(1975); McNees, Freedom of Transit Through International Straits
,
6 J. Maritime L. 175 (1975); Smith, Politics of Lawmaking: Problems
in International Maritime Regulation ~ Innocent Passage v. Free
Transit
, 37 U. Pitt. L. Kev. 487 (1976); Note, Peacetime Passage
by Warships Through Territorial Straits , 50 Colum. L. Rev. 220
(1950); Comment, Free Transit in Territorial Straits: Jurisdiction on
an Even Keel? , 3 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 375 (1973); Nolta, Passage
Through International Straits: Free or Innocent? The Interests at
Stake , 11 San Diego L. Rev. 815 (1974).
117. See , e.g. , Pharand, supra note 37, at. 12.
118. R. Baxter, supra note 53, at 166-68, 185; D. O'Connell, supra note
24, at 327.
119. [1949] I.C.J. 28. The exception to this right of free passage
pointed to the Turkish Straits. The Montreux Convention, which
governs the Straits, was the only existing treaty to restrict
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warship passage at the time of the decision. R. Baxter supra note
53, at 164 n.77; NcNees, supra note 116, at 198-99, n.1lT For a
detailed review of the Montreux Convention's warship transit
provisions, see Froman, Kiev and the Montreux Convention; The
Aircraft Carrier That Became a Cruiser to Squeeze Through the
Turkish Straits , 14 San Diego L. Kev. 681 (1977).
=
~ Exceptions for individual straits regimes appear in both the
1958 and 1982 Conventions, supra note 22, art. 25, and supra note
18, art. 35(c), respectively. Other straits governed by individual
treaties include the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Magellan, the
Danish Straits, and the Straits of Malacca. See , D. O'Connell,
supra note 24, at 317-27. On the Straits of Malacca, see Koh,
Straits in International Navigation: Contemporary Issues 49-95
(1982).
120. Pharand, supra note 37, at 13; Rangel, Le Droit de la Mer dans la
Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de Justice , 7 Thesaurus
Acroasium 259, 276 11977).
121. "Le critere d^cisif paralt plutot devoir etre tire" de la situation
geographique du Detroit, en tant que ce dernier met en
communication deux parties de haute mer, ainsi que du fait que le
Detroit est utilise" aux fins de la navigation internationale." [1949]
I.C.J. 28.
122. "But in the opinion of the Court the decisive criterion is rather its
geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and
the fact of its being used for international navigation." |d.
123. See supra note 53. The shift away from the Court's objective
geographic criterion toward a subjective use criterion appears to
have received impetus from the criticisms of Bruel based upon
arguments of dissenting Judge Azevedo. Rangel, supra note 120,
at 277-78. For a more detailed discussion of the use element, see
Pharand, International Straits , 7 Thesaurus Acroasium 59, 67-71
(1977).
124. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 16(4).
125. See 1982 Convention, supra note 18, arts. 34, 36, 37, &45.
126. As, e.g., one through the territorial sea.
127. Similiarity is measured "with respect to navigational and hydro-
graphical characteristics." Id. art. 36. The Straits of Florida
exemplify this group of straits. Swayze, supra note 23, at 35.
128. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 37.
129. Id. art. 38(1) (emphasis added). This includes the vast majority
oT straits used for international maritime communication.
130. kj. art. 45. The former group consists of those straits formed by
an island and the mainland of the same state where "there exists
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seaward ... a route through the high seas or through an
exclusive economic zone of similiar convenience." jd. art « 38(1).
"[T]he Strait of Messina lying between the Italian mainland and
Sicily" is such a strait. Swayze, supra note 23, at 35. The latter
group comprises only about twenty straits including those of Tiran
(id.) and Juan de Fuca, the Lema Channel, the Jacques Cartier
Pass, and the Jubal Strait. Pharand, supra note 123, at 76.
131. This is the status claimed for the Vil'kitskiy Strait in the Northeast
Passage. See Pharand, supra note 37, at 15-17, 38-41; and infra
text accompanying notes 333-45. For an account of the
controversial transit of another such strait, see Grammig, The
Yoron Jima Submarine Incident of August 1980: A Soviet Violation of
the Law of the Sea , 22 Harv. Int'l L.J. 331 (1981).
132. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 39(1)(c).
133. ]d. art. 38(2).
134. ki. art. 39(1)(a).
135. Id. art. 39. Compare id. arts. 19(2)(a) (threat), 19(2)(h)
"[pollution), & 19(2) U) Tother activities).
136. ]d. art. 40. Compare id. art. 19(2)(j).
137. ki. art. 41. Compare id. art. 22.
138. Id. art. 41(1)-(4). Compare id. arts. 21(1)(a) (navigation and
safety), 21(1)(d) & (e) (fishing), 21(1)(f) (pollution), 21(1)(h)
(customs), & 24(1) (duty not to hamper, impair, deny or
discriminate)
.
139. ki. art. 42(5). Compare id. art. 31.
140. ki. art. 44. Compare ki. art. 24.
141. Compare id. art. 19(2)(l) ("Passage of a foreign ship shall be
considered to be prejudicial ... if in the territorial sea it engages
in . . . any other activity not having a direct bearing on
passage.") with id. art. 38(3) ("Any activity which is not an
exercise of tEFTight of transit passage through a strait remains
subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention."). In
the case of transit passage, this latter provision injects some
uncertainty as to which "other applicable provisions" might apply,
who might apply them, and how they might be applied. For a
discussion of this point, see infra text accompanying notes 187-91.
142. For the purposes of this convention:
(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by
one or more archipelagos and may include other islands;
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(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts
of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such
islands, waters and other natural features form an
intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or
which historically have been regarded as such.
Jd. art. 46.
143. ]d. arts. 47 & 49(1).
144. ]d. art. 47(1).
145. ki. art. 49.
146. ki. art. 50.
147. ki. art. 48.
148. ki. art. 52.
149. ki. art. 53. This provision allows otherwise impermissible
overflight and "normal mode" transit of those portions of the
territorial sea adjacent to archipelagic sea lanes and air routes. "If
an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage may be exercised through
the route normally used for international navigation." Id. para.
12. —
150. ki. art. 54.
151. While deviating from the sea lane axis, "ships and aircraft shall not
navigate closer to the coasts than 10 percent of the distance
between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea lane." Id.
art. 53(5) & (11). "~
152. As used throughout this study, "newly enclosed internal waters"
signifies those waters contemplated by ki. arts. 8 & 35(a) and by
the 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 5.
153. The scope of potential liability for damage to the coastal state
appears to vary directly with the degree of intrusiveness of the
passage. It is broader under the territorial sea provision than
under the straits and archipelagic waters provision. Both recognize
liabilities for loss or damage to coastal states for violation of coastal
state laws and regulations. Beyond this, warships in transit and
archipelagic sea lanes passage may incur liability only by violation
of "other [straits] provisions." 1982 Convention, supra note 18,
art. 42(5). Those in the territorial sea, however, are additionally
subject to liability for non-compliance with any provision of the
Convention or other rules of international law. ki. art. 31.
154. See , e.g. , Comments by Rear Admiral B.A. Harlow, JAG Corps,
U.S. Navy, Duke University College of Law Symposium on Law of





in The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and
Alternatives 133 (1976); cf. Lacharriere, Politiques Nationales a
I'Egard du Droit de la Mer , in Droit de la Mer 7, 55 (1977) ("[l]l
reste qu'il n'est nullement certain qu'une telle convention entre en
vigeur, c'est-a-dire soit adoptee signed et ratified par un nombre
suffisant d'Etats."); Oxman, The New Law of the Sea
, 69 A.B.A.
J. 156 (1983) ("There is a substantial possibility that more than the
necessary 60 states will ratify the convention and bring it into
force in the 1980s.").
The Convention comes into force twelve months after deposit of
the sixtieth instrument of ratification. Id. art. 308(1). Only
forty-five states are parties to the 1958 Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and Contiguous Zone. U.S. Dep't of State, A List of
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1982, at 255.
155. See e.g. Harlow, supra note 154, at 15: "[Cjiven the right of
submerged transit and overflight through straits under Part III of
the treaty, one must address the follow-on question; whether this
part of the treaty is law declaratory, that is, reflective of the
current state of customary international law. I am convinced that it
is." But cf. Richardson, Law of the Sea, supra note 19, at 576
("The . . . Convention as it relates to navigation and overflight
and related uses of the seas is a considerable improvement over
existing law.").
156. D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 331. Accord , Clingan, supra note
20, at 2 ("[Tjhose parts of the Convention dealing with navigation
and overflight . . . reflect prevailing international pracitce.");
Neutze, Whose Law of Whose Sea? , U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. , Jan.
1983, at 43, 48 ("The most important characteristic of the regime of
navigation and overflight laid down in the treaty is its consistency
with current practice.").
157. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 38, art. 2; see supra note
22. The status of unilateral territorial claims to these waters is
subject to dispute by those maritime powers which refuse to recog-
nize such expansive claims in the absence of a treaty.
158. See Harlow, supra note 154, at 7-8.
159. jd. at 1-6, 9; Richardson, Power, Mobility , supra note 19, at 918.
160. Lacharriere, supra note 154, at 55; Richardson, Power, Mobility
,
supra note 19, at 919. For an alternative view of the Law of the
Sea Conference's, hence the Convention's, real purpose, see Pardo,
Commentary , in The Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alterna-
tives 161, 162 (1976):
It may be useful ... to bear in mind the true
purpose of the law of the sea conference as distinguished
from its stated purpose. I believe that, at least for the
majority of the conference, that is, for coastal states, the
true purpose of the conference is to achieve international
recognition of perceived national interests in the seas
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without much regard either to international equity, to the
maintenance of international order, or to the long-term
viability of the treaty.
For possible options in the absence of a treaty, see generally
Knight, supra note 154.
161. See supra pp. 18-20. Expansion of the territorial sea by a factor
of up to four times only highlights the importance of innocent
passage for continued maritime mobility.
162. See D. O'Connell, supra note 21, at 272.
163. See The Corfu Channel Case (Merits), [1949] I.C.J. 4, 30, wherein
the Court emphasized its view that the manner of the British
warships' passage was innocent despite their crews being at battle
stations and prepared to respond to attack. With main batteries
stowed in the fore and aft position and anti-aircraft guns at full
elevation, the ships entered the channel single-file and not in battle
formation. Although British intent was to intimidate Albania, the
Court found persuasive the fact that the warships' objective
behavior did not threaten.
164. 1 H. Silving, Criminal Justice 172-73 (1971).
165. E.g. , force majeure or distress. See 1958 Convention, supra note
2~2T~art. 14(3); 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 18(2).
166. See D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 273. Pharand appears to
concur, supra note 37, at 7, 15.
167. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 14(4); 1982 Convention, supra
note 18, art. 19(1). For the meaning of "security," see supra note
68.
168. The famous observation of the United States Agent, Elihu Root, in
1910 in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, made at a
time when the United States opposed innocent passage in the terri-
torial sea, has been seized on by many modern commentators and
governmental representatives to deny the right of innocent passage
for warships: "Warships may not pass without consent into this
zone because they threaten. Merchant ships may pass because they
do not threaten." 11 Proceedings, North Atlantic Court Fisheries
2007 (1912). Judge Krylov repeated this formula in his dissent in
the Corfu Channel Case. [1949] I.C.J. 74.
169. For a discussion of the Japanese position and the attempt in 1958 of
Yugoslavia to amend the draft 1958 Convention to deny innocent
passage to vessels carrying nuclear weapons, see Crammig, supra
note 131, at 336-42.
170. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 19(2).
171. Cf. Crammig, supra note 131, at 340 (rejection of "broadly-worded
provision" in favor of one "enumerating non-innocent activities
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suggests that the latter provision was meant to be exhausitve." ).
But see D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 270 (omission of "only"
before list of prejudicial actions indicates "catalogue might not be
closed.")
.
172. "Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage shall comply
with the laws and regulations enacted" by the coastal State in con-
formity with these articles and other rules of international law and,
in particular, with such laws and regulations relating to transport
and navigation." 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 17
(emphasis added).
173. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 21 (emphasis added).
174. Or "discriminate in form or in fact" against ships on the basis of
flag or destination state, ki. art. 24.
175. See D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 273-74.
176. "Foreign ships exercising the right of transit passage shall comply
with such laws and regulations [of States bordering straits relating
to transit passage ]." 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 42(4)
(emphasis added).
177. See supra text accompanying notes 170 & 173. Compare id. art.
f9T2)(g) with id. art. 21(1)(h). This is the only innocent passage
qualification which specifically incorporates violation of a coastal
state regulation.
178. Compare id. art. 19(2)(k) ("willful and serious pollution") with id.
art. 21 (1 ) (f) (environmental preservation and pollution control).
179. Compare id. art. 19(2) (i) ("any fishing activities") with id. art.
21 (1)(d) T^onservation of the living resources of the seii^T and id.
art. 21(1 )(e) ("prevention of infringement of . . . fisheries lawsTT
180. Compare id. art. 1 9(2) (j) ("the carrying out of research or survey
activities ffT~with id. art. 21(1)(g) ("marine scientific research and
hydrographic surveys").
181. Compare id. art. 19(2) (k) ("Act aimed at interfering with") with
id. art. 2TCl)(b) ("protection of navigational aids . . . and other
facilities") and id. art. 21(1)(c) ("protection of cables and pipe-
lines"). "Oth"er~facilities or installations" would cover submarine
monitoring devices emplaced on the seabed.
182. kL art. 21 (1 )(a).
183. kK art. 22.
184. kL art. 21(3).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
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186. However, by imposing a requirement not necessarily dependent on
an overt act, one provision of the 1982 Convention, in effect,
reverses the presumption of innocence for nuclear-powered ships
and those carrying nuclear, inherently dangerous, or noxious
substances. It requires all such vessels exercising the right of
innocent passage to "carry documents and observe special pre-
cautionary measures established ... by international agreements."
Id. art. 23. See D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 273. A public
announcement of government policy that henceforward all nuclear
powered and nuclear armed warships will retain proper documents
on board at all times and will observe all special precautionary
measures may, by providing both assurance and a face saving
measure, avoid potential confrontations of such warships with
coastal state enforcement authorities.
187. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, arts. 39(1 )(c) S 38(3). The
former restriction also applies to archipelagic sea lanes passage; the
latter does not. See id. art. 54.
188. Id. art. 19(2) (I). While innocent passage also has a general pro-
hibition, it is hard to conceive of prejudicial activity that would fall
within it but outside all the other prohibited activities. See supra
text accompanying note 170.
189. Threat of use of force. JcL art. 39(1)(b).
190. The better view would be that transit passage remains transit
passage, even if violated. The violation, then, can be dealt with
through the Convention's dispute settlement machinery. See
Harlow, supra note 154 at 13-15: "The regime is one of freedoms
with specific limitations, not one of innocent passage with specific
additions."
191. Although conceptually an analysis of "non-transit passage" might
follow the same reasoning process as that of non-innocent passage,
because the innocent passage rules are more restrictive than transit
passage rules, such an analysis would prove of little value: a
violation of transit passage would most likely also constitute a
violation of innocent passage. It becomes apparent through this
process that the two regimes were not intended to overlap.
192. See generally D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 294-97.
193. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 14.
194. kK para. 5.
195. Id. para. 6.
196. 1982 Convention supra note 18, art. 20.
197. Id. art. 21(1) & (1)(a). See supra text accompanying note 173.
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198. For a discussion of straits and archipelagic waters submerged
transit of which is vital to the U.S. ballistic missile submarine
fleet, see Osgood U.S. Security Interests and the Law of the Sea
,
in the Law of the Sea: U.S. Interests and Alternatives 11, 13-24
(1976).
199. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 16(1); 1982 Convention, supra
note 18, art. 25(1). See also D. O'Connell, supra note 24, at 273.
200. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 23; 1982 Convention, supra




note 199. Due to the immunity of warships, such steps
would necessarily involve less intrusive measures than those taken
against non-innocent passage of merchant vessels.
202. A diplomatic protest demonstrates the coastal state's grave concern
over a serious breach, either a clear case of non-innocent passage
of the threatening type or a flagrant violation of state regulations
resulting in damage or portending serious harm. This action may
accompany other action, such as warning to and expulsion of a
warship, or it may stand alone. If further redress is desired, the
protest can serve to open a dialogue leading to negotiation.
203. See generally , R. Fisher 6 W. Ury, Getting to Yes (1981). If the
parties can communicate with each other, directly or through inter-
mediaries, they can negotiate. Establishing formal or informal lines
of communication is the first step. Many negotiations fail because
parties begin with unreasonable or unacceptable demands and there-
after find themselves unable to move away from them without losing
credibility or face. Id. at 5. By focusing, instead, on their
respective interests, rather than locking themselves into hard
negotiating stances, the parties have a better chance of working
together to solve their mutual problem. Id. at 41-57. Trust is
helpful, if it exists, but it is not a necessary ingredient.
Negotiation can proceed independently of trust as long as each side
is committed to finding a solution based upon mutually agreed
standards. Id. at 13, 85-98. In the context of an incident of
non-innocent passage in the territorial sea, negotiation might seek
to establish public acknowledgement of and apology for the viola-
tion, payment of damages, if any, and assurances of freedom from
future incidents on the one hand or to effect revision of unduly
restrictive regulations or withdrawal of excessive territorial claims
on the other. Most "day-to-day differences" among nations are
likely to find their resolutions through negotiation. W. Bishop,
Jr., International Law Cases and Materials 63 (1962).
204. Should negotiation prove unable to resolve a dispute because of the
hostility or rigidity of the parties, mediation, or good offices, may
succeed. An independent, disinterested third party who can talk
to the parties separately and candidly in private may often convince
them through the institution of good offices to enter direct negotia-
tions with each other or, through mediation, facilitate a mutually
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acceptable solution between them when it would have been impos-
sible for them to achieve one on their own. The mediator in the
non-innocent passage case might, among other things, help each
side to view the matter from the other's perspective, discuss with
the parties their understandings of the applicable principles of law
and their perceptions of the facts, try to get them thinking about
their long-term relationship and how this incident and its solution
will fit into it, or attempt to formulate a working plan which meshes
both parties' needs and interests and which they may then criticize
and revise in an attempt to find an acceptable solution. Mediation
merely suggests an answer; it is for the parties to decide. Both
procedures figure prominently in the Convention on Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I), Oct. 18, 1907, arts.
2-8, 36 Stat. 2197, T.S. No. 536, 1 Bevans 577.
205. Enquiry involves "elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and
conscientious investigation." \d. art. 9. It applies solely to
disputes of fact. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 374. Concilliation
has a broader scope. While it makes factual findings, it may also
refer to applicable rules of international law or to "considerations of
international policy." W. Bishop, Jr., supra note 203, at 64.
Selected in whole or in part by the parties, ad hoc commissions
characteristically perform both procedures. Neither binds the
parties.
206. The United Nations Charter allows resort to any "peaceful means"
chosen by the parties in resolving a dispute, including settlement
under regional or other agreements. U.N. Charter, art. 33(1).
The Security Council may refer disputes to appropriate regional
agencies. Id. art. 52(3). In the event that all of the foregoing
measures fail to resolve the dispute, the parties "shall refer it to
the Security Council," (art. 37(1)) which is empowered to make
recommendations to the parties or, if it finds a threat to the peace,
(art. 39) to sanction the offending party or parties by economic or
other measures, (art. 41) or by the use of force (art. 42). The
likelihood of such action in the case of an alleged violation by the
warship of a major maritime power is extremely remote because the
nations with the world's four largest navies, as permanent members
of the Security Council, retain the power to veto any substantive
Security Council resolution. Id. arts. 23, 27(3). The coastal state
is likely to find little solace here.
207. Arbitration differs from judicial settlement chiefly in that the arbi-
tration panel consists of ad hoc judges chosen by the parties rather
than, for example, the permanent judges of the International Court
of Justice. W. Bishop, Jr., supra note 203, at 64; J. Brierly,
supra note 24, at 347. Because the parties have more control over
the composition of the panel and the scope of its inquiry, arbitra-
tion has in this century become a popular means for settling
disputes which elude informal resolution. See id. at 347-48; W.
Bishop, Jr., supra note 203, at 65-66. Many arbitral tribunals
exist throughout the world, the best known of which is the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. Sharing the same building
at the Hague is the International Court of Justice. All United
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Nations members are automatically parties to the Court. U.N.
Charter, art. 93. States parties may submit disputes to the Court,
which shall decide them on the basis of "international conven-
tions . . . ; international custom . . . ; the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations;" and "rules of law" evidenced
by "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists." Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra
note 57, arts. 35 S 38. The decisions of both tribunals are final
and binding upon the parties to the dispute.
208. Except for this last option, the list is virtually identical to that
contained in article 33 of the U.N. Charter.
209. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 24(1).
210. kL arts. 19(1) & (2)(a) (focusing on the second half of the latter
provision); see supra text accompanying note 170.
211. See kK arts. 18(2) 6 19(2) (Jl).
212. kL art. 18.
213. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 3.
214. kL para. 4.
215. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 279.
216. See supra text accompanying note 166.
217. For a discussion of the sizes and classification of coastal navies see
infra note 282. Concerning suggestions for improving efficiency
and enforcement capabilities of coastal navies, see Hoon, A Model
for Small Navies , U.S. Naval Inst. Proc. Oct. 1980, at 13T! ATthe
time of his writing. Lieutenant Colonel Lim Kwong Hoon was Fleet
Commander of the Republic of Singapore Fleet.
218. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 283(1).
219. Id. art. 279, citing U.N. Charter art. 2(3) & art. 33. For a list
of means corresponding to that of Article 33, see supra notes
203-07 and accompanying text.
220. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 280. Unless the parties agree
otherwise, the Convention's voluntary settlement provisions will
apply only if means of their own choice fail to produce settlement
within the time-limit agreed by the parties. Id. art. 281. Binding
dispute settlement procedures to which the parties "have agreed,
through a general, regional, or bilateral agreement or otherwise,"
apply in lieu of the Convention's voluntary procedures, unless the
parties agree to the contrary. Id. art. 282.
These voluntary means of peaceful settlement, "which can be
described as political means or diplomatic devices do not necessarily
consist of the application of International Law. When using these
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means, norms of International Law are mostly set aside. . . .
[T]he most important and far-reaching fact in connection with these
means is that the emphasis is on the obligation to use them."
Ibler, The Settlement of Disputes arising [sic] from the Inter-
pretation and Application of the Sea Law Convention with Special
Consideration of the Spring 1976 New York Session of the Law of
the Sea Conference , 7 Thesaurus Acroasium 453, 458-59 (1977).
221. kL art. 284 & annex V.
222. kL art. 283(2).
223. kL_ art. 286.
224. See Carreho, La Solucidn a los Controversias en el Derecho del
Wr , in Derecho Del Mar 311, 327-28 (1976); Sohn, Settlement of
Disputes Arising Out of the Law of the Sea Convention , 12 San~
Diego L. Rev. 495, 516-17 (1975).
225. See , e.g. , Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note
57, art. 36.
226. Sohn, Conflict Management under the Law of the Sea Convention , in
Conflict Management on the Oceans 1, 8 (June 1977) (International
Peace Academy Occasional Paper #1); see Sohn, Settlement of
Disputes , supra note 224.
227. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 287. Their structure and
procedures reflect the influence of the Hague counterparts. Id.
annexes VI—VI 1 1 . The Tribunal, composed of 21 members and based
In Hamburg, may organize itself into special chambers of three or
more members to deal with particular categories of disputes. Id.
annex VI, arts. 2(1), 1(2), & 15. Except for the Sea-Bed Disputes
Chamber, the Tribunal is accessible only by "States Parties." Id.
art. 291 & annex VI, art. 20. Applying the "Convention and other
rules of international law not incompatible with [it]," or principles
of equity at the request of the parties, the Tribunal has the power
to prescribe provisional measures to dismiss unfounded claims, and
to award default judgments when it is satisfied "that it has
jurisdiction" and "that the claim is well-founded in fact and law."
Id. arts. 293, 290, 294, & annex VI, arts. 25 & 28. Decisions are
final and binding upon all parties to the dispute and any
intervenors. ]d. art. 296 & annex VI arts. 31-33.
Two types
-
of arbitration are provided for: general and
functional. Genral arbitration is accomplished by a five-member
panel selected from a pool comprised of four nominees by each State
Party. Each party to a dispute appoints one arbitrator, and they
mutually agree on the other three. Id. annex VII, arts. 2 6 3.
The tribunal determines its own procedure, affording "each party a
full opportunity to be heard and to present its case." |d. art. 5.
Decision is by majority vote, default judgments may be entered, and
the award is "final and without appeal, unless the parties to the
dispute have agreed in advance to an appellate procedure." jd.
arts. 8, 9, & 11.
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The functional or "special" arbitral tribunal differs in that it
is composed of legal, scientific or technical experts. Every State
may nominate two experts in "each of the fields of (1) fisheries,
(2) protection and preservation of the marine environment, (3)
marine scientific research, and (4) navigation." Id. annex VIII,
art. 2. Parties having disputes concerning any of the foregoing
fields may separately appoint two arbitrators from the appropriate
list, only one of whom may be its national, and, together appoint a
fifth member, who shall be president of the special tribunal. Id.
art. 3. Both binding and non-binding fact finding options are also
available. Id. annex VIII, art. 5.
228. kK art. 287.
229. kL paras. 1-3.
230. kL paras. 4 6 5.
231. kL_ arts. 297 & 298.
232. Id. art. 297(1 ) (a)-(b) . The terms "sovereign rights or
jurisdiction" identify the exclusive economic zone as the subject of
these limiations and serve to distinguish it from straits
("sovereignty or jurisdiction") and the territorial sea and
archipelagic waters ("sovereignty"). Compare id. arts. 1, 34, &
49, with id. art. 56(1):
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, of the
waters superadjacent to the sea-bed and of the
sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other
activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant
provisions of this convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine
environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this
convention. (Emphasis added.)
233. The provision appears to guarantee international and limit national
jurisdiction.
234. See Carreflo, supra note 224, at 323.
235. See Gaertner, The Dispute Settlement Provisions of the Convention
or~the Law of th~e Sea: Critique and Alternatives to the Inter-7
"




236. International Peace Academy, Summary Report, Proceedings of
Diplomatic Consulation, June 31, 1977, New York City, in Conflict
Management on the Oceans, supra note 226, at 48.
237. As a practical matter, those disputes in which compulsory juris-
diction is limited would not occur in the territorial sea anyway
because they are not permitted innocent uses: "Marine scientific
research" and "fisheries." 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art.
297(2) S (3).
238. The exclusive economic zone extends 200 miles form the baseline of
the territorial sea, but it begins where the territorial sea ends.
Thus, with a 12-mile territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone
measures 188 miles in breadth. Dividing the breadth of the
economic zone by that of the territorial sea yields a ratio of about
one to 15£, considering some allowance for variations in actual
square area due to coast-line contour.
239. Transit passage and archipealgic sea lanes passage differ only in
degree.
240. See Gaertner, supra note 235, at 584-86.
241. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 298.
242. kL art. 298(1 )(b). A state may "declare in writing that it does
not accept any one or more of the [compulsory] procedures pro-
vided for in section 2 with respect to one or more of the following
categories of disputes": sea boundary delimitations or historic
bays, military and law enforcement activities, and those in which
the Security Council is acting. Id. For a discussion of the
historic bays exception, see infra text accompanying notes 354-57.
243. Gaertner, supra note 235, at 586.
244. M. Janis, supra note 17, at 62.
245. Its evolution may be traced from its first proposal in 1974, listed in
Sohn, supra note 224, at 515:
(d) Disputes concerning military activities [unless
the State conducting such activities gives its express
consent. 1
through the 1 May 1975 draft appended to the Informal Single
Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8/SD.Gp. /2nd
Session/No. 1 annex I, art. 17(3) (c):
(c) Disputes concerning military activities, including
those by government vessels and aircraft engaged in
non-commercial service, but law enforcement activities




to the final version, supra text accompanying note 242.
246. Note again the term "sovereign rights or jurisdiction." See supra
note 232. Concerning the reference to paragraphs 2 and 3 oT~^
article 297, see supra note 237.
247. Examples of "normal mode" transit include submerged passage for
submarines and "normal and necessary defensive measures integral
to perimeter security" for surface vessels. For an aircraft carrier
this "would include defensive deployment of acoustical bouys and a
protective helo net, both activities being normal to the vessel,
purely defensive in nature, and in no way directed at, or posing of
a threat to, the resource rights or security interests of the coastal
state." Harlow, supra note 154, at 20.
248. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, arts. 39 & 54.
249. kL arts. 42(2) & 44.
250. See Caertner, supra note 235, at 586:
The limitations and exceptions to the compulsory
dispute settlement provisions show the influence of the
G-77 [Croup of 77], Through the use of these
provisions, the coastal State members of the G-77 can
exercise a great deal of discretionary power concerning
the uses of EEZs without having to submit any dispute to
a procedure which would entail a binding decision.
251. "A State Party which has made a declaration under paraagraph 1
shall not be entitled to submit any dispute falling within the
excepted category of disputes to any procedure in this Convention
as against another State Party, without the consent of that party."
1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 298(3).
252. This analysis would also include disputes arising in straits and
archipelagic waters.
253. In this case, resort would be made to original declarations. See
supra text accompanying notes 228-30. "In the event of a dispute
as to whether a court or a tribunal has jurisdiction, the matter
shall be settled by decision of that court or tribunal." Id. art.
288(4).
254. See Caertner, supra note 235, at 580 n.13, 593-94.
255. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
256. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 405.
257. Statement of Secretary of State Webster in The Caroline , noted jn




259. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 407, citing the Nuremberg Tribunal.
260. "A sumbarine which is attacked in the territorial sea may be
justified in responding to the attack by torpedoing the surface
vessel . . . . " O'Connell, supra note 12, at 451.
261. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 429 (emphasis in original).
262. See supra note 163.
263. Professors Knight and McDougal find no inconsistency with the
U.N. Charter in using force to preserve an existing right. See
Knight, supra note 154, at 141-2; McDougal, Commentary , id. at
156-57. Contra Pardo, Commentary, id. at 163-64; Sohn,
Discussion, id. , at 169.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 270-73.
265. Knight, supra note 154, at 142.
266. Cf. Caertner, supra note 235, at 593-94.
267. For commentary on the U.S. Navy's policy of challenging excessive
maritime claims, see Richardson, Power, Mobility , supra note 19, at
902. For an example of this type ot passage see intra text
accompanying notes 346-57.
268. This is similar to the Corfu Channel Case. See supra note 163.
269. See C. Allison, Essence of Decision 32-35, 78-96, 162-81 (1971).
270. jdL at 24.
271. T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict 4 (1960). This corresponds
with Allison's Model I decisionmaking paradigm, supra note 269, at
10.
272. T. Schelling, supra note 271, at 15-16. Schelling lists various
strategic moves, icT. ch. 5, at 119-61.
273. This formulation assumes within "harm anticipated" the deterrent
effect of its anticipatable response to coastal state action.
274. Cf. R. Petrow, Across the Top of Russia, 352-53 (1967).
275. See Balupuri's observation supra note 84.
276. One example of a maritime power acting as a coastal state is
President Truman's 1945 declaration of jurisdiction over the
continental shelf, which "produced a chain reaction in the [Latin
American] region." Pohl, Latin America's Influence and Role in the




277. Various other overlapping groupings occurred during the
negotiations. Those which predated the Third Law of the Sea
Conference included geographic groupings tied to the United
Nations; independent regional organizations such as the European
Economic Community, the Arab League, the Organization of African
Unity, and the Organization of American States; and the Croup of
77, all members of which were developing countries. A second
category of groups formed during the conference. The first of
these grew out of common geographic features. Membership of
these groups cut across both economic and ideological lines: the
coastal states, numbering approximately twenty-five and including
countries such as Canada, Norway, Australia, Chile, Mexico, India,
and Great Britain — those for which extension of rights seaward
would be most advantageous; the geographically disadvantaged and
landlocked states, numbering approximately fifty; five archipelagic
states; and a group of Latin American and African states claiming
200-mile territorial seas. The other major division centered around
similarity of economic or technical development related to the
oceans. This included the maritime nations and the researchers.
Lacharriere, supra note 154, at 15-18.
278. For a broader comparison of the contrasting positions and interests
of developing and industrialized nations during the law of the sea
negotiations, a division which corresponds roughly to the coastal
state-maritime power distinction made here, see kL at 7-56.
279. See comments of Arvid Pardo, supra note 160.
2.12-sY
280. See supra notesA. For a more detailed discussion of specific regional
sovereignty and economic concerns, see Ferreira, The Role of
African States in the Development of the Law of the Sea at the
ThTrd UN Conference 7 Ocean Dev. S Int'l L. 89(1979); Pohl,
supra note 276, at 65.
281. See M. Janis, supra note 17, at 63, 68-70.
282. Janis classifies coastal navies into three categories following the
first class (U.S. and Soviet) and second class (British and French)
"blue water, SSBN navies":
Some 21 third-class navies have more than 10 major surface
combatants (cruisers, destroyers, and frigates), usually some
submarines, and occasionally an aircraft carrier. These third
class navies typically have between 80 and 250 vessels in
all.
. . .
Another 29 fourth-class navies have at least one, but no more
than 10, major surface combatants. Fourth-class navies have
no aircraft carriers, rarely a cruiser, and number about 50
vessels in all. . . .
Finally, the remaining 72 minor maritime forces can be termed
fifth-class navies. A fifth-class navy has no major surface
combatants and rarely more than a dozen vessels in all.
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Id . at 63-64. Updated information concerning these classifications
appears in U.S. Naval Inst. Proc, Mar. 1983 (containing regional
reviews of Latin American, Western European, East European,
Middle Eastern, North African, South Asian, African south of the
Sahara, and Far Eastern Navies).
283. In this regard, however, one commentator does not see a significant
difference from the naval power point of view in a show of naval
strength at three miles or at twelve: "The presence of naval forces
at 12 miles can still be used to display resolve or determination to a
government looking through high-powered binoculars or radar."
Neutze, Bluejacket Diplomacy: A Juridicial Examination of the Use
of Naval Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy
, 32 JAG
J. 81, 155 (1982).
284. One of the most difficult areas for coastal states is observation and
surveillence of maritime activities within their jurisdiction. Many
coastal states will have to rely on "international services" to
provide satellite monitoring data for enforcement purposes.
International Peace Academy, Summary Report, Proceedings of
Diplomatic Consultations, in New York City (Jan. 31, 1977) in
Conflict Management on the Oceans, supra note 226, at 47, 48-51.
285. See Caertner, supra note 235, at 580 n.13, 593-4.
286. Slonium identified a "security group" at the law of the sea
negotiations which "placed primary emphasis on the sovereignty of
the coastal state and considered the right of innocent passage as a
mere courtesy . . . . " supra note 58, at 125.
287. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
288. Moore, A Foreign Policy for the Oceans , in the Oceans and U.S.
Foreign Policy 1, 2 (Ocean Policy Study 1:4, Apr. 1978).
289. See , e.g . , Richardson, Law of the Sea , supra note 19, at 553-55.
This, of course, has not been true of the Soviet Navy, which has
. , only within the^two decades shifted its attention from defense of
*- ai
""homeland to global presence. See MccCuire, supra note 17,
particularly 160-63; McConnell, Strategy and Missions of the Soviet
Navy in the Year 2000 , in Problems of Sea Power, supra note 17, at
39, 43.
290. Estimates on the exact number of such straits vary, perhaps based
on differing points of view concerning use for international naviga-
tion. See , e.g . , Osgood, supra note 198, at 11, 14 (1976) (setting
the numb"er at 121); Neutze, supra note 156, at 43, 45-47 (noting
116 such straits and providing a chart of 63 of them along the
Pacific Rim); Major Issues of Law of the Sea 133-135 (1976) (listing
106 such straits together with widths and littoral states in tabular
form condensed from 2 S. Lay, R. Churchill, & M. Nordquist, New
Directions in the Law of the Sea 885-91 (1973)).
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291. "The question of straits remains the most vital legal issue of sea
power, because it is in confined waters that naval coups can best
be effected under the pretext of self-defense and there that
intolerable obstructions can be effectively raised to strategic and
tactical deployment." D.O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea
Power 103 (1975).
292. See , e.g. , Froman, The 200-mile exclusive Economic Zone: Death
"Knell for the American Tuna Industry
, 13 San Diego L. Rev. 707
(1976).
293. Ceddes, The Future of United States Deep Seabed Mining: Still in
the Hands of Congress , 19 San Diego L. Kev. 613, 614-16 (1982).
An illustration of two deep-sea mining methods appears in Oxman,
supra note 154, at 156, 161.
294. See supra note 20.
295. Moore, supra note 288, at 2-3; see Knight, supra note 154, at 138.
296. Moore, supra note 288, at 3-4.
297. United States: "control of the sea, projection of power ashore,
strategic deterrence, and naval presence"; USSR: "defense of the
homeland" (including strategic deterrence and conventional defense),
"sea denial," and "naval presence"; Great Britain: "strategic
deterrence," "regional defense," and "protecting distant water
interests"; France: "territorial security" (including strategic
deterrence), "security of Europe and the Mediterranean," and
"fulfillment of France's overseas commitments." Neutze, supra note
283, at 83 (U.S.); Janis supra note 17, at 23-24 (USSR), 39-41
(Great Britain), S 53-55 (France)
.
M.
298. See , e.g. , A Janis, supra note 17, at 1-2. The least vulnerable leg
of the U.S. strategic triad, nuclear submarines carrying ballistic
missiles are capable of performing assured destruction and soft
counterforce missions. See Panel on U.S. Security and the Future
of Arms Control, Carnegie Endowment of International Peace,
Challenges for U.S. National Security 38-39, 42-43 (1982).
299. See, e.g. , Harlow, supra note 154, at 7-20. But only three straits
strategically important to submerged transit of ballistic missile
submarines would be overlapped by twelve mile territorial seas:
Gibraltar, Ombai-Wetar and Lombok, the latter two of which also lie
within the Indonesian Archipelago. Osgood, supra note 198, at
14-15.
300. See also Panel on U.S. Security, supra note 298, at 42-43, 61;
Katner, Commentary, in Problems of Sea Power, supra note 17, at
73, 75-76; Osgood, supra note 290, at 13-20. Cf. Secretary
Weinberger: "The United States will maintain a strategic nuclear
force posture such that, in a crisis, the Soviets will have no
incentive to initiate a nuclear attack on the United States or our
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allies." Policy, Strategy & the Budget , Defense 82, May 1982, at
13.
301. "The submarine's objectives will range from reconnaissance, mining,
delivery of saboateurs or agents, and survivor evacuation, to
attacks on military or mercantile shipping." Taylor, Surface
Warships Against Submarines
,
U.S. Naval Inst. Proc, May 1979, at




302. See O'Conneli, supra note 12, at 451. "United States and NATO
submarines identify themselves pursuant to these procedures, but
Soviet ones do not." D. O'Conneli, supra note 291, at 144.
303. Half of the.entire Soviet submarine force is based with the Northern
Fleet at Murmansk, on the Kola Pennisula; the Baltic Fleet has a
somewhat smaller submarine force, Swarztrauber, supra note 17, at
110.
304. Recall the periscope sighted near the grounded submarine well
inside Swedish waters, supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
305. For a similar response to a" similar inquiry, see Crammig, supra
note 131, at 331-32.
306. Swarztrauber, supra note 17, at 110.
307. See infra note 312.
308. A 1909 Russian Law on the Extension of the Maritime Customs Zone
is "cited by the USSR as having established the breadth of its
territorial waters at 12 miles." Pharand, supra note 37, at 28.
309. See discussion of the 1960 Statute on the Protection of the State
Border of the USSR and its prior authorization rule in id. at 30-33
and Butler, supra note 47, at 118, 127-30.
310. Instruction of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, reported in Pravda,
August 29, 1961, noted in 1 V. Sebek, The Eastern European
States and the Development of the Law of the Sea 308 (1979).
Bulgaria and Roumania have the same rule. Id.
311. See supra note 84.
312. The great majority of submarines which have been
detected in territorial waters in recent years are believed
to have been Soviet, and they are rendered vulnerable by
the Soviet view of the right of warships to traverse the
territorial sea. Faced with extended territorial sea
claims, the Soviet navy can complete oceanographical
investigations, upon which its strategic doctrine is being
erected, only by submarine invasion of the marginal
waters of other nations. In this respect, too, the transi-
tion of the Soviet navy from a coastal defense force into a
-97-

instrument of global sea power has distorted to the point
of contradiction Societ doctrine on the law of the sea.
D. O'Connell, supra note 291, at 141. Professor O'Connell believed
that in view of this shift to a global mission, "the Soviet navy has
gone cold on the notion that warships may not transit the territorial
sea without previous permission." Id.
313. See id. at 142-44; cf. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Rel. §45
comment g ("In ordeF to have a right of innocent passage, a
foreign submarine must navigate on the surface and show its
flag."); 1 V. Sebek supra note 310 and accompanying text. The
four factors most useful for judging innocence of submarine transit
are "the reasonableness of the use of the territorial sea for transit
purposes, which may be in ratio with its extent, the weather condi-
tions at the time, the political climate, and most important, the
track taken by the submarine." D. O'Connell, supra note 291, at
143.
314. Since the Soviet Union seems to have been at the receiv-
ing end of most of the attacks which have been made on
unidentified submerged submarines; it may have been
hoist by its own petard. For if warships have no right
of innocent passage the submarine should not have been
in the territorial sea at all. It is an invader, to be dealt
with like any other invader. Some countires of the Soviet
bloc have declared that unidentified submarines will be
attacked and destroyed. The victim can, therefore,
hardly complain.
Id. at 142.
315. 1958 Convention, supra note 22, art. 16(1); cf^ 1982 Convention,
supra note 18, art. 25(1 ).
316. Cf^ D. O'Connell, supra note 29, at 143-44:
While the use of force against a submerged submarine in
the territorial sea is not ruled out, on the argument that
entry of a warship for purposes other than that of
innocent passage is an intrusion upon the national
territory and may be repelled just as a military intrusion
on land may be, every measure should be taken short of
force to require the submarine to leave. ..."
317. 2 August 1964. E. Potter, Illustrated History of the United States
Navy 278 (1971).
318. At the time of the attck on 8 June 1967, the Liberty was 15 miles
north of the Sinai penninsula. The attack killed 34 crew members
and injured 75. kl. 278-79.
319. One was killed and three wounded in the 22 July 1968 attack on the
Pueblo . The ship was boarded and seized and the surviving crew
of 82 imprisoned for eleven months. Id. 279.
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320. For a possible exception concerning the Maddox
,
see infra note 326
and accompanying text. The Pueblo was seized "15.3 nautical miles
from the nearest land . . . and 16.3 nautical miles from the main-
land of North Korea." Dean, The Pueblo Seizure: Facts, Law,
Policy
, 63 Am. Society of International L. Hroc. 1(1969). Opinion
is divided on whether at some point in its mission the Pueblo may
have strayed inside the North Korean's tacitly claimed twelve-mile
territorial sea. Compare Aldrich, Questions of International Law
Raised by the Seizure 67 the U.S.S. Pueblo , id. at 2, 3 ("[W]e are
satisfied that the ship did not at any time intrude into territorial
waters claimed by North Korea.") with Butler, The Pueblo Crisis:
Some Critical Reflections
,
jd. at 7, 10 ("[T]here is no absolute
assurance that at some point the vessel did not violate the North
Korean boundary.")
321. [T]he activities of the Pueblo were lawful and could not
legitimately be termed espionage. There is no precedent
for a suggestion that visual or electronic observation on
the high seas can be treated as espionage by any state.
Such observation is a common practice in the world today;
virtually all warships of all navies carry out visual and
electronic observation as a normal part of their activities.
Aldrich, supra note 320, at 5.
322. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 19(2)(c).
323. See Dean, supra note 320, at 2; Aldrich, supra note 320, at 3-4.
324. North Vietnam (1964), North Korea (date unavailable). Major
Issues in Law of the Sea, supra note 290, at 30.
325. Israel (1956). |d.
326. Osgood, supra note 198, at 29-30. Concerning the U.S. Navy
policy of challenging such claims, see supra note 267 and infra note
343 and accompanying text.
327. The advent of sophisticated high-altitude photography —
first from the U-2, and since 1961 by reconnaissance
satellite - has added enormously to the volume and reli-
ability of information about opposing deployments and
developments that can be obtained by national means.
Satellite reconnaissance has been tacilty accepted as a
legitimate intelligence activity, at least by the United
States and the USSR. Neither seems to regard it as
violating the rights of the observed state at international
law.
Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements
,
85 Harv. L. Rev. 905, 951-52(1972). »[T]he phrase 'national
technical means' in SALT I further legitimized the use of such
techniques without specifying what they entailed." Lowenthal, Salt
Verification , Congressional Research Service Library of Congress
(78-142F July 10, 1978), at 9.
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Near the end of the American Society of International Law
discussion of the Pueblo seizure, the following exhange occurred:
Professor Alberto J. Cabrielli. Is the policy of sending
electronic equipment to explore the defense of other
countries compatible with bona fide principles of inter-
national law?
Mr. Aldrich. If by bona fide principles you mean inter-
national fair play, yes, it is in the interests of a stable
world order to have as open societies as possible. The
great risks today come from threats that are maintained in
secrecy.
63 Am. Society International Law 27(1969). See also supra note
321.
328. "A surprise armed attack of this character is clearly a dispropor-
tionate response to the threat posed by an electronics intelligence
vessel, but it nevertheless is illustrative of the magnitude of
concern felt by the coastal state." Butler, supra note 320, at 9.
329. Cf. D. O'Connell, supra note 291, at 142: "[C]oastal States will
increasingly resent intrusion into areas where they wish to claim
exclusive economic rights, and where damage can be done to their
interests. Inevitably they will want to regulate shipping in the
area, and the lurking submarine is unlikely to escape their legal
nets."
330. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 298(1 )(b). See supra notes
241-54 and accompanying text.
331. \d. art. 297(2) S (3).
332. jd. art. 297(1)(a) & (b).
333. More commonly known today as the "Northern Sea Route."
Pharand, supra note 37, at 15.
334. Cf. id. at 41.
335. Pharand seems to conclude that the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and
Chukchi Seas are Soviet territorial waters. Id. at 35-38. But he
notes that between 1962 and 1965 U.S. Coast
-
Guard icebreakers
carried out oceanographic surveys in each of these seas as well.
Id. at 38. But if these seas were considered territorial waters by
tTTe Soviet Government, would not these icebreakers have encoun-
tered the same denial of access for lack of prior authorization? The
evidence Pharand relies on to distinguish these "territorial" seas
from internal waters appears to support equally their classification
as high seas.
336. Id. at 16.
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337. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
338. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
339. Statute on the Protection of the State Border of the USSR, (1960),
3 Soviet Statutes and Decisions, No. 4 (Summer 1967), at 10-24,
summarized in Bulter, supra note 47, at 118-20.
340. ki. art. 16.
341. See R. Petrov, supra note 274.
342. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding its
serious implications for U.S. - Soviet relations, such an assertion
might likely have been suicidal for two modestly armed icebreakers
in the home waters of the Soviet's Northern Fleet.
343. Statute on the State Border, supra note 339, art. 16.
344. See supra note 312.
345. The U.S. position has already been noted, supra notes 20 & 194
and accompanying text. Although the Soviet bloc abstained from
voting to adopt the treaty in April 1982, its members signed the
Convention on 10 December 1982 in Jamaica. Bureau of Public
Affiars, Department of State, CIST, Law of the Sea 1 (Nov. 1982);
Oxman, supra note 154, at 156.
346. Neutze, The Gulf of Sidra Incident: A Legal Perspective , U.S.
Naval Inst. Proc, Jan. 1982, at 26, 27-29.
347. ki. at 27.
348. Id. at 27-28. The United States also filed a protest with the
United Nations Security Council. Id. at 27.
349. kL at 28-29. Within four months of the claim, the U.S. State
Department denonced the Lybian claim, and between 1977 and 1981
the U.S. Navy conducted eight large-scale exercises ... in the
disputed area without significant incident." Id. at 29.
350. Actually, if Lybia's claims were valid, it would constitute an
analogous but possibly more serious violation because Lybia claims
the Culf as historic "internal" waters; nevertheless, for analytical
purposes we shall treat it as a question of territorial waters.
351. Nearly the opposite occurred. The U.S. fighters intercepted the
Lybian fighters to warn them of the missile exercise in the area —
as U.S. aircraft had warned more than 60 Lybian military aircraft
the previous day, without incident. Before the warning could be
given, "one of the Lybian aircraft suddenly launched an Atoll
missile at the lead F-14." ]d. at 27.
352. Compare supra text accompanying and following note 342.
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353. Cf. Osgood supra note 198, at 29: "Where military security . . .
Is" involved, the maritime states have been bolder in backing their
interests."
354. 1982 Convention, supra note 18, art. 298(1 ) (a) (i)
.
355. ki. subpara., ii.
356. Id. Although the parties remain free to agree to other procedures
TTus provision appears to require them to agree upon a mutually
acceptable binding procedure to resolve the dispute. To interpret
it otherwise relegates the ultimate decision of these matters to the
realm of force.
357. See Caertner, supra note 235, at 86-88.
358. J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 13.
359. jd. at 15-16.
360. Id. at 16. "To the extent that sovereignty has come to imply that
tTTere is something inherent in the nature of states that makes it
impossible for them to be subjected to law, it is a false doctrine
which the facts of international relations do not support." ki. at
47.
361. jd. at 9.
362. ki. at 17.
363. ki.
364. For its place among other modern sources of international law, see
supra note 57.
365. See J. Brierly, supra note 24, at 49-56.
366. ki. at 56.
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